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"THROUGH A GLASS, DARKLY": HOW THE COURT
SEES MOTIONS TO DISQUALIFY CRIMINAL
DEFENSE LAWYERS
Bruce A. Green*
When I was a child, I spake as a child, I understood as a
child, I thought as a child; but when I became a man, I put
away childish things.
For now we see through a glass, darkly; but then face to
face .... I
Unfortunately for all concerned, a district court must pass
on the issue of whether or not to allow a waiver of a conflict of
interest by a criminal defendant not with the wisdom of hind-
sight after the trial has taken place, but in the murkier pre-trial
context when relationships between parties are seen through a
glass, darkly. 2
Suppose that before the outset of a criminal trial it appears that the
attorney hired by the accused will have a conflict of interest which may
affect his ability to wage a vigorous defense. The prosecutor moves to
disqualify defense counsel, contending that the representation would
be unethical and unfair to the accused, thus jeopardizing any subse-
quent conviction. The defendant opposes the motion and agrees to
waive any future claims based on counsel's potential conflict. Is it nev-
ertheless appropriate to grant the prosecution's disqualification
motion?
Although raised frequently in the lower courts, the question of
what the trial judge's role is in conflict-of-interest cases has, for nearly
half a century, lurked in the background of the Supreme Court's deci-
sions concerning the scope of a criminal defendant's right to the undi-
vided loyalty of his attorney. Last term, as its conflict-of-interest
jurisprudence reached middle age, the Court had the opportunity to
articulate its views on that question. In Wheat v. United States,3 the Court
* Associate Professor of Law, Fordham University. A.B. 1978, Princeton Univer-
sity; J.D. 1981, Columbia University.
I am grateful for the research assistance provided by the Stein Institute on Law and
Ethics. In addition, I am grateful to Professors Marc M. Arkin, DanielJ. Capra, Gerard
E. Lynch, Michael M. Martin, and Georgene Vairo for their helpful comments on earlier
drafts of this Article.
1. 1 Corinthians 13:11-:12 (KingJames).
2. Wheat v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 1692, 1699 (1988).
3. 108 S. Ct. 1692. For commentaries on the Wheat decision, see Stuntz, Waiving
Rights in Criminal Procedure, 75 Va. L. Rev. 761, 797-801 (1989); The Supreme Court,
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held that a trial judge has discretion to disqualify defense counsel, even
over the defendant's objection, if a serious possibility for a conflict of
interest exists.
The Court's reflections on the trial judge's role in conflict-of-inter-
est cases are important, not only because they guide the conduct of trial
judges in a significant number of criminal trials, but also because they
illuminate other aspects of the Court's conception of the adversary pro-
cess. The Court's efforts to define the trial judge's role are colored by
its views of at least five subsidiary issues: (1) the ethical rules concern-
ing conflicts of interest; (2) the extent to which defense attorneys can
be trusted to avoid ethical violations; (3) the nature of the relationship
between defense attorneys and their clients and the importance of lim-
iting judicial intrusion into that relationship; (4) the importance of the
autonomy of the criminal accused; and (5) the institutional interests of
the judiciary in criminal cases. C
The Court's thinking about these issues has unquestionably
evolved over time, but that does not mean that its understanding of
these issues has grown any more profound. To the contrary, an exami-
nation of Wheat in light of the Court's earlier efforts strongly suggests
that now, even more than before, the Court views the trial judge's role
in the adversary process "through a glass, darkly." This presents trial
judges with a problem. Their own views of their role in the adversary
process are informed by their experience presiding over numerous
criminal trials; thus, some trial judges are likely to reject the relatively
simplistic view of their role expressed in Wheat in favor of their own,
more complex views. Yet these same judges are bound by the decision
in Wheat, and will be able to derive little guidance from it.
This Article examines Wheat v. United States in light of the Supreme
Court's earlier conflict-of-interest cases in an effort to provide greater
guidance to trial judges. As background, Part I briefly discusses the
relevant Supreme Court decisions, beginning in 1942 and culminating
last year with Wheat. Part II demonstrates the inadequacy of the Court's
reasoning in Wheat. It argues that Wheat ignores the more sophisticated
aspects of the Court's earlier jurisprudence, including the Court's un-
derstanding of the relative importance of client autonomy and the sanc-
tity of the attorney-client relationship, while building on both a
misunderstanding of the prevailing standards of professional responsi-
bility and an unfair assumption that defense lawyers will not comply
with those standards. Thus, Part II views Wheat not as a sign of matura-
tion, but as a step backward in the Court's conception of the adversary
process. Finally, Part III addresses the trial judge's need for further
guidance in cases in which defense counsel has a potential conflict of
1987 Term-Leading Cases, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 143, 180-91 (1988); Note, Sixth Amend-
ment-Paternalistic Override of Waiver of Right to Conflict-Free Counsel at Expense of
Right to Counsel of One's Choice, 79J. Crim. L. & Criminology 735 (1988).
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interest, and proposes a framework for the trial judge's exercise of dis-
cretion in such cases.
I. BACKGROUND: THE DEFENDANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO
COUNSEL'S UNDIVIDED LOYALTY
When a defense attorney simultaneously represents two defend-
ants who have been jointly charged, the interests of the two clients may
conflict, with the result that the attorney may be unable adequately to
defend one client without undermining the other's defense. For exam-
ple, it may benefit the first client to try to show that he unwittingly par-
ticipated in criminal acts at the behest of his codefendant, but an
attorney who represents both defendants cannot pursue this strategy
without harming his second client.4 In other instances, the conflict aris-
ing out of the simultaneous representation of codefendants may be less
obvious. For example, when the government's proof against each de-
fendant is qualitatively or quantitatively different, a lawyer representing
both defendants at the same trial cannot use his examination of wit-
nesses and his arguments to the jury to underscore the weakness of the
evidence against one client without implicitly calling attention to the
strength of the evidence against the other.5 Conflicts like these, which
arise from the joint representation of codefendants, have received the
most attention from courts6 and commentators. 7 Nevertheless, an at-
torney's representation may give rise to a conflict of interest in other
4. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Williams v. Franzen, 687 F.2d 944, 949-50 (7th
Cir. 1982); see also United States v. Roth, 860 F.2d 1382, 1385-89 (7th Cir. 1988) (in-
formation provided by defendant in connection with plea bargain creates conflict where
it might inculpate another of counsel's clients), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 2099 (1989).
5. See Geer, Representation of Multiple Criminal Defendants: Conflicts of Interest
and the Professional Responsibilities of the Defense Attorney, 62 Minn. L. Rev. 119,
127-28, 131-33 (1978).
6. See generally Annotation, Circumstances Giving Rise to Prejudicial Conflict of
Interests Between Criminal Defendant and Defense Counsel-State Cases, 18 A.L.R.4th
360 (1982 & Supp. 1988); Annotation, Circumstances Giving Rise to Prejudicial Conflict
of Interests Between Criminal Defendant and Defense Counsel-Federal Cases, 53
A.L.R. Fed. 140 (1981 & Supp. 1988); Annotation, Circumstances Giving Rise to Con-
flict of Interest Between or Among Criminal Codefendants Precluding Representation
by Same Counsel, 34 A.L.R.3d 470 (1970 & Supp. 1988).
7. See, e.g., Aronson, Conflict of Interest, 52 Wash. L. Rev. 807, 829-33 (1977);
Cole, Time for a Change: Multiple Representation Should Be Stopped, 2 Nat'l J. Crim.
Defense 149 (1976); Geer, supra note 5; Girgenti, Problems ofJoint Representation of
Defendants in a Criminal Case, 54 St.John's L. Rev. 55 (1979); Hyman, Joint Represen-
tation of Multiple Defendants in a Criminal Trial: The Court's Headache. 5 Hofstra L.
Rev. 315 (1977); Lowenthal, Joint Representation in Criminal Cases: A Critical Ap-
praisal, 64 Va. L. Rev. 939 (1978); Moore, Conflicts of Interest in the Simultaneous
Representation of Multiple Clients: A Proposed Solution to the Current Confusion and
Controversy, 61 Tex. L. Rev. 211, 271-86 (1982); Tague, Multiple Representation and
Conflicts of Interest in Criminal Cases, 67 Geo. L.J. 1075 (1979); Developments in the




situations as well, such as when the defense attorney formerly repre-
sented a government witness8 or when the attorney himself is a poten-
tial trial witness. 9
A. Decisions Prior to Wheat
Beginning in 1942 with its decision in Glasser v. United States,10 the
Supreme Court has recognized repeatedly that a criminal defense law-
yer's conflict of interest is a problem of constitutional, and not simply
ethical, dimension." In Glasser, the Court held that a trial judge may
not interfere with a defendant's right to receive his attorney's undi-
vided loyalty by ordering defense counsel to represent a codefendant.
Glasser, a former federal prosecutor in charge of liquor cases in
Chicago, was accused of accepting bribes in exchange for dismissing
criminal cases. When a codefendant, another former federal prosecu-
tor, informed the court that he was not satisfied with his appointed at-
torney, the trial judge proposed that Glasser's attorney simultaneously
represent both defendants. Glasser initially objected, but then was si-
lent when the judge ordered the joint representation. Both defendants
were subsequently convicted. On reviewing the trial record, the Court
found that, in order to promote the interests of Glasser's codefendant,
the defense attorney had failed to object to the admission of certain
evidence and had failed fully to cross-examine some of the prosecution
witnesses.1 2 Based on this finding, the Court overturned Glasser's con-
viction, holding that " 'the assistance of counsel' guaranteed by the
Sixth Amendment contemplates that such assistance be untrammeled
and unimpaired by a court order requiring that one lawyer shall simul-
taneously represent conflicting interests."' 13
At the same time, however, the Court recognized that the defend-
ant may generally waive his right to conflict-free representation, just as
he may waive many other constitutional rights at trial. 14 A valid waiver
8. See, e.g., Roth, 860 F.2d at 1385-86; United States v.James, 708 F.2d 40 (2d Cir.
1983); United States v. Moscony, 697 F. Supp. 888, 889-93 (E.D. Pa. 1988); see also
infra notes 73-76 and accompanying text. See generally Lowenthal, Successive Repre-
sentation by Criminal Lawyers, 93 Yale LJ. 1 (1983) (assessing frequency with which
criminal defense lawyers confront former clients as government witnesses and ethical
implications of such situations).
9. See, e.g., Roth, 860 F.2d at 1386; United States v. Micke, 859 F.2d 473, 480-81
(7th Cir. 1988); United States v. Cunningham, 672 F.2d 1064, 1074-75 (2d Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 466 U.S. 951 (1984).
10. 315 U.S. 60 (1942).
11. See, e.g., Burger v. Kemp, 107 S. Ct. 3114 (1987); Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S.
335, 342-45 (1980); Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 481-87 (1978).
12. 315 U.S. at 72-74.
13. 315 U.S. at 70.
14. See, e.g., Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835-36 (1975) (waiver of right to
counsel); Ross v. Wainwright, 738 F.2d 1217, 1221 (11 th Cir. 1984) (waiver of right to
competent counsel), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1055 (1985); United States v. Frye, 738 F.2d
196, 200 (7th Cir. 1984) (waiver of right to trial by pleading guilty); United States ex rel.
1204 [Vol. 89:1201
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will later foreclose the defendant from overturning his conviction on
the basis of his attorney's conflict of interest.' 5 The standard adopted
in Glasser to govern the waiver of this right, 16 like the standard gov-
erning the waiver of other rights afforded criminal defendants, was de-
rived from the Supreme Court's opinion in Johnson v. Zerbst,17 which
stated that "[a] waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or
abandonment of a known right or privilege."' 8 In the Court's view,
Glasser's professional experience was one relevant consideration, but it
was not sufficient in itself to overcome the presumption against the
waiver of constitutional rights.' 9 While concluding that Glasser had
not effectively relinquished his right,20 the Court left little room for
Williams v. DeRobertis, 715 F.2d 1174, 1178 (7th Cir. 1983) (waiver of right to trial by
jury), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1072 (1984); United States v. Hammond, 605 F.2d 862, 863
(5th Cir. 1979) (waiver of right to present witnesses); see also Pfeifer v. United States
Bureau of Prisons, 615 F.2d 873, 876-77 (9th Cir.) (waiver of right to habeas review),
cert. denied, 447 U.S. 908 (1980).
15. See, e.g., United States v. Roth, 860 F.2d 1382, 1389 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. de-
nied, 109 S. Ct. 2099 (1989); United States v. Krebs, 788 F.2d 1166, 1173 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 930 (1986); United States v. Williams, 809 F.2d 1072, 1085 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 228, 259, 506 (1987).
16. 315 U.S. at 70-71.
17. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
18. Id. at 464. The Court added: "The determination of whether there has been
an intelligent waiver of the right to counsel must depend, in each case, upon the particu-
lar facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experi-
ence, and conduct of the accused." Id. See generally Stuntz, supra note 3, at 795-801
(discussing waiver of counsel).
19. 315 U.S. at 70. Following Glasser, some judges argued that a defendant's deci-
sion to give up the right to an attorney whose loyalties are undivided, and to proceed to
trial with an attorney who has a conflict, could never be a truly "knowing" decision, at
least in cases involving multiple representation. This argument was put most forcefully
by CircuitJudge Oakes in United States v. Mari, 526 F.2d 117, 119-21 (2d Cir. 1975)
(Oakes, J., concurring), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 941 (1976), and by DistrictJudge Lacey in
United States v. Garafola, 428 F. Supp. 620, 623-26 (D.NJ. 1977), aff'd sub nom.
United States v. Dolan, 570 F.2d 1177 (3d Cir. 1978); see also United States v. Carrigan,
543 F.2d 1053, 1058 (2d Cir. 1976) (Lumbard,J., concurring); Lowenthal, supra note 7,
at 971-72. The contention was that an attorney who represents codefendants cannot
anticipate all of the conflicts that may arise and therefore cannot explain the dangers of
multiple representation with sufficient particularity to enable the defendant to make an
informed decision. Most courts have not accepted this argument, however, and have
generally considered a defendant's voluntary waiver to be a "knowing" decision. This
makes the waiver valid as long as the defendant understood, in a general sense, the
dangers created by his attorney's conflict. See infra note 131 and accompanying text.
20. 315 U.S. at 70-72. In his dissenting opinion in Glasser, Justice Frankfurter ar-
gued that the defendant should have been foreclosed from asserting a constitutional
challenge because he had acquiesced in the trial judge's decision to appoint Glasser's
lawyer to represent the codefendant. Justice Frankfurter stressed that the defense attor-
ney had agreed to accept the joint representation and that Glasser, an experienced pros-
ecutor who was well aware of his rights, did not renew his objection. Id. at 88-92
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting). A majority of the Court rejected this analysis, finding that
Glasser's right to independent counsel could not be relinquished simply by his failure to
object, but only by an affirmative waiver. Id. at 70-72.
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doubt that a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to independent
counsel would generally foreclose a defendant from later raising a suc-
cessful sixth amendment challenge.
Almost four decades later, in Holloway v. Arkansas,21 the Court reaf-
firmed that the sixth amendment guarantee of "assistance of counsel"
includes a right to be represented by an attorney whose loyalty is undi-
vided. In that case, a single defense attorney was appointed to repre-
sent three men charged with robbery and rape, notwithstanding the
attorney's assertion that the defendants' interests conflicted and that, as
a consequence, he would be unable to cross-examine witnesses effec-
tively. The Court held that the trial judge should have either appointed
separate lawyers for the three defendants or, at minimum, inquired into
defense counsel's representations to determine whether the defend-
ants' interests did in fact conflict. The Court overturned the defend-
ants' convictions, holding that, under Glasser, "whenever a trial court
improperly requires joint representation over timely objection reversal
is automatic."'22
Two years later, in Cuyler v. Sullivan,23 the Court held that a de-
fendant who can demonstrate that his attorney had a conflict of interest
may be entitled to a new trial, even if the attorney was hired by the
defendant, and the trial judge had no affirmative role in creating the
conflict.24 As in Holloway, the Court considered a defendant's claim
that his attorney had a conflict arising out of the simultaneous repre-
sentation of two codefendants. The Court acknowledged that "a
possible conflict inheres in almost every instance of multiple representa-
tion," 25 but recognized at the same time that not every instance of mul-
tiple representation involves an actual conflict between the
codefendants' interests. To the contrary, in many cases, codefendants
whose interests are closely aligned may benefit from a common de-
fense.26 The Court held that a mere "possibility of conflict is insuffi-
cient to impugn a criminal conviction." 27 In a case unlike Holloway, that
21. 435 U.S. 475 (1978).
22. Id. at 488.
23. 446 U.S. 335 (1980).
24. See id. at 344-45 ("Since the State's conduct of a criminal trial itself implicates
the State in the defendant's conviction, we see no basis for drawing a distinction be-
tween retained and appointed counsel that would deny equal justice to defendants who
must choose their own lawyers.").
25. Id. at 348 (emphasis added).
26. Id.; see infra notes 59-60 and accompanying text. There may be other substan-
tial advantages in multiple representation. See Margolin & Coliver, Pretrial Disqualifica-
tion of Criminal Defense Counsel, 20 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 227, 251-57 (1982) (practical
reasons for multiple representation include personal bond between defendants, trust in
particular lawyer, pooling resources, and skepticism of prosecutor's motives in seeking
to disqualify defense counsel); Tague, supra note 7, at 1124-25 (advantages include
sharing cost of prominent attorney and having expertise of attorney who can guide de-
fendants through grand jury investigation).
27. 446 U.S. at 350.
1206 [Vol. 89:1201
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is, in which the existence of defense counsel's conflict is not apparent at
trial, a convicted defendant must demonstrate that "counsel actively
represented conflicting interests. '28 Furthermore, the defendant must
show that the conflict "adversely affected his lawyer's performance." 29
The Court recently applied the Sullivan standard in a capital mur-
der case, Burger v. Kemp. 30 Petitioner Burger and codefendant Stevens
were tried separately for the brutal drowning of a taxi driver. Two law
partners, appointed to represent the defendants, participated jointly in
the representation of each defendant. Reviewing the record, a five-
Justice majority found that the shared representation did not constitute
an actual conflict of interest and that, even if it did, the lawyers' advo-
cacy was unaffected.31 In contrast, three dissenting Justices found both
that the joint representation constituted an active conflict of interest,3 2
and that the conflict undermined the representation of Burger.3 3 This
28. Id.
29. Id. at 348. Sullivan's requirement that a defendant show an actual-as opposed
to a potential--conflict of interest makes it difficult for him to establish that he was de-
prived of a constitutional right. In many cases, the conflict may be a subtle one, and the
facts needed to establish its existence may not be easily accessible. Even in hindsight, it
may be hard to show that other interests served by defense counsel were in fact adverse
to the defendant's interests. See, e.g., United States v. Bradshaw, 719 F.2d 907, 915-18
(7th Cir. 1983) (finding no actual conflict in defense tactics chosen by attorney where
defendant's assertion that he was less culpable than codefendants held without merit).'
At the same time, the responsibility to show that counsel's representation was impaired
by the conflict may pose an even more difficult problem for a convicted defendant.
Much of a defense lawyer's conduct is not recorded, and the evil of a conflict is often
"'in what the advocate finds himself compelled to refrain from doing.'" Cuyler v.
Sullivan, 446 U.S. at 357 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quot-
ing Holloway, 435 U.S. at 490). A defendant who learns only after trial that his attorney's
loyalties were divided may have a hard time showing precisely how the lawyer's conflict
adversely affected his investigative decisions, his advice regarding whether to plead
guilty, his conduct of plea negotiations, or his performance at trial.
The defendant's burden is less substantial in a case where "a trial court improperly
requires joint representation over [the defendant's] timely objection." Holloway, 435
U.S. at 488. In such a case, a criminal defendant may obtain a new trial without proving
that defense counsel's conflict impaired his representation. Id. at 490; accord Wood v.
Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 272-74 (1981).
The burden in conflict-of-interest cases is, in either situation, less onerous than in
cases where the defendant alleges that he received ineffective assistance of counsel but
that counsel's inadequacies were not attributable to a conflict of interest. In such cases,
the defendant must show that counsel's errors "actually had an adverse effect on the
defense." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 693 (1984). See generally Berger,
The Supreme Court and Defense Counsel: Old Roads, New Paths-A Dead End?, 86
Colum. L. Rev. 9, 88-96 (1986) (criticizing Strickland's outcome-based prejudice test).
30. 483 U.S. 776 (1987).
31. Id. at 783-85.
32. The dissent found that "[the defendants'] interests were diametrically opposed
on the issue that counsel considered to be crucial to the outcome of petitioner's case-
the comparative culpability [of the defendants]." Id. at 802 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
33. The dissent found that Burger's representation was impaired in two principal
ways. First, it caused the attorneys to refrain from pursuing a plea bargain for Burger on
1989] 1207
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case illustrates not only the problems of proof imposed by the Sullivan
standard, but also the importance of addressing potential conflicts of
interest in advance of trial, when the court can still substitute an in-
dependent attorney for one whose loyalties are divided.3 4
B. The Decision in Wheat
In Wheat v. United States,35 the Court confronted the question
whether a defendant must be permitted to waive conflict of interest
claims and proceed to trial with his choice of counsel-a question which
had split the lower federal courts.3 6 Rejecting the defendant's argu-
ments premised on the sixth amendment right to counsel, the Court
the basis of his lesser culpability. Id. at 803-04. Second, in appealing from the death
sentence imposed on Burger, the lawyers were compelled to refrain from arguing that
the sentence was disproportionate because Burger was less culpable than his codefend-
ant. Id. at 804-05.
34. Of course, unless a potential conflict is identified by a trial judge, by a defense
attorney or by the prosecutor, it is unlikely to be addressed in advance of trial, since an
unsophisticated defendant generally cannot and is not expected to bring the problem to
the court's attention. See, e.g., Sullivan, 446 U.S. at 347 (trial judge must initiate inquiry
when he "knows or reasonably should know that a particular conflict exists"); Holloway,
435 U.S. at 485-86 ("defense attorneys have the obligation, upon discovering a conflict
of interest, to advise the court at once of the problem"); Mannhalt v. Reed, 847 F.2d
576, 583-84 (9th Cir.) (prosecutor must bring "potential conflict to the trial judge's
attention and move for disqualification if appropriate"), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 260
(1988); Green, Her Brother's Keeper: The Prosecutor's Responsibility When Defense
Counsel Has a Potential Conflict of Interest, 16 Am.J. Crim. L. 323, 328 (1989) (argu-
ing that "a criminal prosecutor has a duty to disclose defense counsel's potential conflict
to both the defense attorney and to the trialjudge"). But see Dukes v. Warden, 406 U.S.
250, 257 (1972) (petitioner knew his attorney represented two codefendants in an unre-
lated case but " 'never complained to the court that he was not satisfied with [the attor-
ney] because of this dual representation'" (quoting opinion below, 161 Conn. 337,
344-45, 288 A.2d 58, 62 (1971))).
35. 108 S. Ct. 1692 (1988).
36. In United States v. Curdo, the Second Circuit concluded that a defendant's know-
ing, voluntary waiver must be respected. 694 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1982). See also cases
cited infra note 155.
In contrast, the Third Circuit held in United States v. Flanagan that defense counsel
may be disqualified when he has a serious potential conflict, regardless of whether the
defendant is willing to waive his right to conflict-free representation. 679 F.2d 1072 (3d
Cir. 1982), rev'd on other grounds, 465 U.S. 259 (1984); see also In re Paradyne Corp.,
803 F.2d 604, 611 n.16 (11th Cir. 1986); United States v. Washington, 797 F.2d 1461,
1465 (9th Cir. 1986); United States v. Phillips, 699 F.2d 798, 801-02 (6th Cir. 1983),
overruled on other grounds, United States v. Tosh, 733 F.2d 422 (6th Cir. 1984); Geer,
supra note 5, at 158-60; Lowenthal, supra note 7, at 967-68.
The court in Flanagan stressed that a defendant does not have an absolute right to
the counsel of his choice. 679 F.2d at 1075; see also Dolan, 570 F.2d at 1182-83; cf.
Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 12-15 (1982) (trial court may refuse to grant continuance
where defendant's chosen, privately retained lawyer is unavailable for trial). Moreover,
the Third Circuit reasoned that a defendant's decision to be represented by an attorney
who has a potential conflict "implicates more considerations and affects more people
than does a decision to proceedpro se." 679 F.2d at 1076 n.5. For example, in the Third
Circuit's view, defense counsel's potential conflict threatens to undermine the court's
[Vol. 89:12011208
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determined that a trial judge has discretion to disqualify a defense at-
torney who has either an actual conflict of interest or a "serious poten-
tial for conflict." 3 7
Wheat and a large number of codefendants were jointly charged
with conspiring to distribute thousands of pounds of marijuana over a
period of several years. Two of Wheat's codefendants, Bravo and
Gomez-Barajas, were represented by an attorney named Iredale, while
Wheat was represented by a different attorney. Gomez-Barajas went to
trial first. According to the district judge, Iredale did a "fantastic job"
at trial,3 8 and managed to secure his client's acquittal on the narcotics
charges. Iredale also represented Gomez-Barajas in connection with
unrelated charges and arranged for his client to plead guilty to two rel-
atively minor counts. In addition, with Iredale's assistance, Bravo en-
tered a guilty plea to a narcotics charge that was less serious than the
charges contained in the indictment.3 9
Several days before his trial was scheduled to commence, Wheat
sought to be represented by Iredale in place of, or in addition to, his
original trial lawyer. Although Iredale agreed to take Wheat's case, the
prosecutor objected on the ground that Iredale's representation of the
two other defendants created a conflict of interest. The government's
principal assertion was that Bravo might be called to testify against
Wheat, in which case Iredale's duty to preserve Bravo's confidences
would preclude him from conducting a meaningful cross-examination.
The government also argued that, if Gomez-Barajas's plea was not ac-
cepted and he went to trial, Wheat might be called to testify against
Gomez-Barajas. In that event, Iredale might be impeded in his efforts
to cross-examine Wheat.
In response, the defense argued that the purported conflict arising
out of Bravo's potential testimony was unduly speculative, since Bravo
was unlikely to implicate Wheat and there would thus be no need to
discredit him. Similarly, the defense argued that it was highly unlikely
that Gomez-Barajas would go to trial after tendering a plea of guilty,
and that, if he did, it was equally unlikely that Wheat would be called to
testify against him. More importantly, the defense asserted that Wheat,
Bravo, and Gomez-Barajas each had agreed to the represention and
were prepared to waive any future conflict-of-interest claims. The de-
fense argued that, under these circumstances, Wheat was entitled to his
integrity and to subject the trial judge to subsequent challenges to the fairness of the
proceedings. See Dolan, 570 F.2d at 1184.
The Supreme Court had an earlier opportunity to resolve this disagreement when it
reviewed the Third Circuit's decision. Flanagan, 465 U.S. 259 (1984). However, the
Court reversed on jurisdictional grounds, finding that an order disqualifying defense
counsel is not immediately appealable.
37. 108 S. Ct. at 1698-1700.
38. Id. at 1703 n.3 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting record below).
39. Id. at 1694-95.
1989] 1209
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choice of counsel. However, at the prosecutor's urging, the district
judge decided to override Wheat's waiver of his right to conflict-free
representation. Wheat was forced to go to trial without Iredale's assist-
ance and was convicted.
In an opinion upholding the trial judge's decision, the Court
adopted a two-step analysis. The Court first determined that a defense
attorney may be disqualified when the trial court finds that he actually
represents conflicting interests. The Court acknowledged that a de-
fendant has an interest in retaining the attorney of his choice; this does
not justify an absolute right to counsel of choice, however, but only a
constitutional "presumption in favor of counsel of choice." 40 Where
legitimate countervailing interests are sufficient, this presumption can
be overcome. Thus, in determining whether the sixth amendment for-
bids the trial judge from depriving criminal defendants of their choice
of counsel in a particular class of cases, the court must engage in a
balancing of interests.
In the Court's view, federal courts have three legitimate interests
that are jeopardized by a defense attorney's representation of conflict-
ing interests. First, "[flederal courts have an independent interest in
ensuring that criminal trials are conducted within the ethical standards
of the profession."'41 The Court cited ethical standards contained in
the American Bar Association (ABA) and California codes of profes-
sional ethics which "impose limitations on multiple representation of
clients," and which, the Court implied, are violated whenever defense
counsel has an actual conflict of interest.42 Second, the Court found
that the judiciary has an institutional interest in ensuring "that legal
proceedings appear fair to all who observe them," and that this interest
may also be jeopardized when defense counsel represents conflicting
interests. 43 Finally, the Court pointed to "the legitimate wish of Dis-
trict Courts that their judgments remain intact on appeal."' 44 The
Court opined that this desire may not be fully satisfied by the defend-
ant's waiver because of "the apparent willingness of Courts of Appeals
to entertain ineffective assistance claims from defendants who have spe-
cifically waived the right to conflict-free counsel."'45 In the Court's
view, there was "no doubt" that these interests were of sufficient mag-
nitude to permit a trial judge to reject a proferred waiver and disqualify
40. Id. at 1697. The presumption in favor of counsel of choice applies only to
those defendants who can afford to retain their chosen counsel. It does not extend to
those indigent defendants whose counsel is appointed by the court. See, e.g., Caplin &
Drysdale v. United States, 57 U.S.L.W. 4836, 4838 (1989); Burgos v. Murphy, 692 F.
Supp. 1571, 1575 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (citing cases).
41. 108 S. Ct. at 1697.
42. Id. at 1697-98.
43. Id.




an attorney who has an actual conflict of interest.4 6
This initial determination did not resolve the question posed by
Wheat, since at the time the trial judge denied Wheat's motion to substi-
tute or add Iredale as defense counsel it was uncertain whether Iredale
would have a conflict of interest at trial. Accordingly, the second step
of the Court's analysis was a determination that a trial judge's discre-
tion to disqualify defense counsel extends beyond those "rare cases
where an actual conflict may be demonstrated before trial,"' 47 to in-
clude those cases in which defense counsel has only a potential conflict.
The Court began by observing that, in advance of trial, "relationships
between parties are seen through a glass, darkly," and, as a conse-
quence, "[t]he likelihood and dimensions of nascent conflicts of inter-
est are notoriously hard to predict."'48 Because of these uncertainties, a
defendant's pre-trial waiver of the right to conflict-free representation
is suspect. The Court emphasized the difficulty that defense counsel
faces both in assessing the risk that a conflict will ensue and in explain-
ing that risk to the accused; in addition, the Court suggested that de-
fense attorneys cannot be trusted to convey all of the relevant
information to their clients. For these reasons, a trial judge must be"allowed substantial latitude in refusing waivers of conflicts of interest
• . . in the more common cases where a potential for conflict exists
which may or may not burgeon into an actual conflict as the trial pro-
gresses."' 49 However, the Court limited the trial judge's authority to
disqualify defense counsel to those cases in which counsel is discovered
to have "a serious potential for conflict."' 50 Absent a serious potential
for conflict, a trial judge must allow a defendant to waive potential con-
flicts of interest and proceed to trial with chosen counsel.
In drawing the line as it did, the Court was allocating the risk of a
potential conflict, although it did not employ that language. The ques-
tion was: Who should bear the risk that the trial judge will err in pre-
dicting that defense counsel will have an actual conflict of interest?
The Court's conclusion was that, when the potential for conflict is seri-
ous, it is constitutionally acceptable to place the risk of error on the
46. Id. The Court may have had other institutional concerns that went unex-
pressed. For example, the Court may have had an aesthetic concern: that it is unseemly
for a lawyer to cross-examine a present client. The Court may also have been concerned
that the fairness of the proceedings would have been undermined in a manner favorable
to Wheat. Because Iredale was representing Bravo, a potential government witness, he
would have the opportunity to coach Bravo to give testimony that was shaded in Wheat's
favor. See infra note 94.
47. 108 S. Ct. at 1699.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 1700. The Court could have reached the same result by reasoning that
proceeding to trial when there is a serious potential for conflict is itself an ethical viola-
tion, either because it creates an appearance of impropriety, or because defense counsel
has an ethical duty to withdraw from the representation when he cannot discount the
possibility of a conflict. See Developments in the Law, supra note 7, at 1474 n.24.
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defendant, just as in the unusual case in which a trial judge can deter-
mine with certainty before trial that defense counsel will have an actual
conflict of interest.51 Yet the Court's recognition of the trial judge's
difficulty in predicting whether a conflict will arise would seem to justify
striking the balance more favorably to the defendant. Although the de-
fendant's interest in counsel of choice seems just as compelling
whether counsel has an actual or nascent conflict, the judicial interests
which justify the disqualification of counsel seem less compelling when
there is a possibility that defense counsel's loyalties ultimately will re-
main undivided.
II. THE SUPREME COURT'S VIEW OF THE TRIAL JUDGE'S ROLE IN
CONFLICT-OF-INTEREST CASES
A. The Ethical Responsibilities of Lawyers
Although the ethical standards governing conflicts of interest have
evolved over the past half decade, the Supreme Court's understanding
of those standards has not kept pace. At the time of the Court's earliest
conflict-of-interest case, Glasser v. United States,52 the relevant profes-
sional standard was encapsulated in a single provision of the Canons of
Professional Ethics.53 Canon 6 deemed it "unprofessional to represent
conflicting interests, except by express consent of all concerned given
after a full disclosure of the facts."'54 This provision was consistent with
the common law of agency,55 from which the Canons were in large part
derived. It enjoined undisclosed conflicts, but did not compel an attorney
51. Although fourJustices dissented in Wheat, none challenged the underlying legal
premises that a defendant's right to counsel of choice is not absolute, and that a defend-
ant's choice of counsel may be rejected in order to avert a potential conflict of interest.
In a dissenting opinion joined by Justice Brennan, Justice Marshall agreed with the
Court that "[w]hen a defendant's selection of counsel, under the particular facts and
circumstances of a case, gravely imperils the prospect of a fair trial, a trial court may
justifiably refuse to-accede to the choice," since "a serious conflict may indeed destroy
the integrity of the trial process." 108 S. Ct. at 1700 (Marshall,J., dissenting). Similarly,
in a dissenting opinion joined by Justice Blackmun, Justice Stevens "agree[d] with the
Court's premise that district judges must be afforded wide latitude in passing on mo-
tions" to disqualify defense counsel on the basis of a potential conflict. Id. at 1704
(Stevens, J., dissenting). However, in the dissenters' view, the trial judge in Wheat had
erred in disqualifying Iredale because there had not been a serious possibility that a
conflict would arise if Iredale were to represent Wheat. Id. at 1702-03 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting); id. at 1704 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
52. 315 U.S. 60 (1942).
53. Canons of Professional Ethics (1908).
54. Id. Canon No. 6. This provision defined conflicts of interest narrowly, explain-
ing: "Within the meaning of this canon, a lawyer represents conflicting interests when,
in behalf of one client, it is his duty to contend for that which duty to another client
requires him to oppose." Id.
55. See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Agency § 387 (1958) ("Unless otherwise agreed,
an agent is subject to a duty to his principal to act solely for the benefit of the principal
in all matters connected with his agency.") (emphasis added); id. § 394 ("Unless othenvise
agreed, an agent is subject to a duty not to act or to agree to act during the period of his
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to abjure from representing conflicting interests with the informed con-
sent of his clients. 56
In Glasser, the Court overturned the conviction of a defendant
whose attorney was ordered to represent a codefendant simultane-
ously. The Court perceived defense counsel's failure to object to the
introduction of certain evidence, which would have been admissible
only against the codefendant, to be clearly "indicative of [defense coun-
sel's] struggle to serve two masters,"'57 an observation to which the
Court repeatedly has adverted in its more recent decisions. 58 Yet, con-
sistent with Canon 6, the Glasser opinion contained no suggestion that,
absent the defendant's objection to this arrangement, the joint repre-
sentation would have been improper. To the contrary, in language
with which the majority expressed no disagreement, a dissentingJustice
Frankfurter underscored the potential advantages of joint representa-
tion: "Joint representation is a means of insuring against reciprocal re-
crimination. A common defense often gives strength against a common
attack."' 59 The contemporary Court has reiterated this language
frequently.60
In the past two decades, however, the professional standards gov-
erning conflicts of interest have become longer, more restrictive,- and
more complex. Contemporary professional standards, unlike the Ca-
nons of Professional Ethics, establish that sometimes joint representa-
tion may not be undertaken even with the clients' informed consent.
Under the Model Code of Professional Responsibility ("Model Code"),
an attorney may accept the representation, with the informed consent
of the joint defendants, only if it is "obvious" that the attorney can
represent both defendants "adequately" despite their potentially con-
agency for persons whose interests conflict with those of the principal in matters in
which the agent is employed.") (emphasis added).
56. Ethics opinions of the American Bar Association concerning Canon 6 held that,
when a conflict of interest involved a client that was a government entity, a lawyer could
not engage in the representation, because the "public" cannot give its consent to a con-
flict. See, e.g., ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 77
(1932); id. Formal Op. 34 (1931); id. Formal Op. 16 (1929). Except to that extent, the
prevailing view appears to have been that, although the representation of clients with
conflicting interests might sometimes be unwise or unseemly, see, e.g., H. Drinker,
Legal Ethics 299 app. (1953) (reporting ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Griev-
ances, Dec. No. 297), it was not unethical if both clients consented. But cf. id. at 120
("The Canon does not sanction representation of conflicting interests in every case
where such consent is given, but merely forbids it except in such cases.").
57. 315 U.S. at 75.
58. See, e.g., Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 349 (1980) (quoting Glasser);
Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 482 (1978) (same). The biblical injunction against"serving two masters," Matthew 6:24, is often invoked by the courts as an expression of
a traditional principle of agency law. See, e.g., Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton,
481 U.S. 787, 814 (1987).
59. 315 U.S. at 92 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
60. See, e.g., Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 784 (1987); Sullivan, 446 U.S. at 348;
Holloway, 435 U.S. at 482-83.
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flicting interests. 61 Similarly, under the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct ("Model Rules"), an attorney may represent codefendants,
with their informed consent, only when "the lawyer reasonably believes
the representation will not be adversely affected" by the potential
conflict.62
Neither the Model Code nor the Model Rules categorically forbid
the representation of codefendants simply because there is a possibility
that a conflict will arise. Nor is the representation forbidden in all in-
stances in which a conflict is likely to arise. While it may be prudent to
avoid potential conflicts arising out of multiple representation, the pro-
fessional standards do not require a lawyer to do so. If defense counsel
reasonably concludes that the codefendants' interests will not in fact
conflict, or that a conflict will not significantly affect the representation,
he is free to accept the representation upon his clients' informed
consent. 63
The decision in Wheat bespeaks the Court's failure to grasp the
complexity of the professional standards as they have developed over
time. The fundamental premise of Wheat was that, when the trial judge
61. Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 5-105 (1981). Some commenta-
tors have interpreted DR 5-105 to establish virtually a per se prohibition of multiple
representation. See, e.g., 1 G. Hazard & W. Hodes, The Law of Lawyering: A Hand-
book on the Model Rules of Professional Conduct 132-33 (1985); Geer, supra note 5, at
155. This view finds support in EC 5-15, which states that "[a] lawyer should never
represent in litigation multiple clients with differing interests; and there are few situa-
tions in which he would be justified in representing in litigation multiple clients with
potentially differing interests." Model Code of Professional Responsibility EC 5-15.
Since the interests of codefendants are "potentially differing" in almost all cases, this
Ethical Consideration would suggest that the representation of codefendants is almost
never appropriate. But this Ethical Consideration is undercut, at least to some extent,
by the one that follows: EC 5-16 discusses the obligation to make full disclosure "[i]n
those instances in which a lawyer is justified in representing two or more clients having
differing interests," and a footnote meant to provide some illustration quotes exten-
sively from the Glasser decision, in which a single attorney did represent jointly charged
defendants. Id. EC 5-16 & comment.
62. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.7(b)(1) (1983). By the time Wheal
was decided, the Model Rules had supplanted the Model Code in approximately half the
states. See Lawyers' Manual on Professional Conduct 01:3-4 (Aug. 30, 1989).
63. Commentators have argued that the once common practice of representing co-
defendants in criminal cases should be categorically forbidden. See, e.g., Geer, supra
note 5, at 155-56; Lowenthal, supra note 7, at 983-84; Developments in the Law, supra
note 7, at 1394-96. However, the prevailing professional norms do not appear to go
that far. Indeed, neither the Model Code nor the Model Rules treat multiple representa-
tion in criminal and civil cases differently.
The ABA Standards for Criminal Justice would place greater restrictions on the
representation ofjointly charged defendants in criminal cases. Standards for Criminal
Justice (2d ed. 1980). Standard 4-3.5(b) provides that an attorney should not represent
more than one defendant at trial, even with the defendants' informed consent, unless it
is clear, after full investigation, that no conflict is likely to develop. The Standards gen-
erally have not been adopted by state courts or legislatures, however, and for that rea-
son are entitled to less weight as an expression of the prevailing professional standards.
1214' [Vol. 89:1201
DISQUALIFICATION MOTIONS
denied Wheat's motion for substitution of counsel, there was a serious
possibility that Iredale's representation of Wheat would have resulted
in Iredale's violation of the ethical "limitations on multiple representa-
tion of clients."' 64 As a result, the disqualification of Iredale was
thought to promote "the ethical standards of the [legal] profession." 65
The Court arrived at this conclusion without examining the relevant
standards governing conflicts of interest or considering how they would
have applied to the facts in Wheat.6 6 Had it done so, the Court would
have found no reason to believe that Iredale's representation of Wheat
and two of his codefendants would have violated the professional
standards.
The Wheat Court apparently proceeded on the assumption that all
potential conflicts of interest are as troublesome as those addressed in
the Court's previous cases, in which an attorney was engaged to repre-
sent codefendants who awaited either a joint trial6 7 or successive tri-
als.68 Such cases bear out the Court's generalization that "[t]he
likelihood and dimensions of nascent conflicts of interest are notori-
ously hard to predict" in advance of trial because the interests of joint
defendants, while appearing to be substantially similar at the outset,
may later diverge in material ways. 69 If a conflict does emerge between
the interests ofjoint defendants, it may pervade defense counsel's rep-
resentation, substantially impairing his conduct of pretrial negotiations
or of the trial itself.70
However, the Court failed to recognize that the type of conflict en-
visioned by the trial judge in Wheat would have been far less significant
than the conflicts arising out of the representation of multiple defend-
ants at joint or successive trials. Wheat was not a case in which defense
counsel would represent codefendants at trial. It was a case in which, at
worst, defense counsel would simultaneously represent a defendant
and a government witness, since the government's case against two of
attorney Iredale's three clients was essentially over and only Wheat was
still awaiting trial. 7 1 As a result, the potential conflict faced by Iredale
64. 108 S. Ct. at 1697.
65. Id.
66. The Court cited, but did not paraphrase, quote, or analyze, the professional
standards that applied in California, where Wheat was tried. Id. at 1697-98. This was
not unusual. Although the Court has occasionally cited the standards governing con-
flicts of interest, it has never analyzed them in detail. See, e.g., Sullivan, 446 U.S. at 346
n.1 1; Holloway, 435 U.S. at 486 n.8.
67. Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 476 (1978); Glasser v. United States, 315
U.S. 60, 63 (1942).
68. Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 781 (1987); Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335,
338 (1980).
69. 108 S. Ct. at 1699; see also Geer, supra note 5, at 145.
70. See, e.g., Geer, supra note 5, at 125-35.
71. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
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would not be proscribed by prevailing ethical norms to the same extent
as the conflicts in the Court's prior cases.
Because Wheat was the only client awaiting trial, the most signifi-
cant ethical concern identified in Wheat was the possibility that, if code-
fendant Bravo's testimony was to tie Wheat to particular deliveries of
marijuana, attorney Iredale "would have been unable ethically to pro-
vide" the vigorous cross-examination that would have been needed to
impeach Bravo. 72 This was essentially the same problem that typically
arises when a defense attorney is called upon to cross-examine a for-
mer, rather than a current, client. 73 The defense attorney has a duty
under such circumstances to preserve his former client's confidences
and is not permitted to exploit those confidences in cross-examining
the former client.7 4 However, there is a danger that, in the course of
cross-examination, the lawyer will inadvertently reveal the the former
client's confidences. 75 Of greater significance to the accused, there is
also a danger that, in an effort to avoid misusing confidential informa-
tion, defense counsel may fail to explore fully legitimate areas of cross-
examination, thereby depriving his present client of the most vigorous
defense possible.76
Under the prevailing professional standards, a potential conflict
arising out of the need to cross-examine a former client is appropriately
deemed less serious than a conflict arising out of the joint representa-
tion of codefendants. Indeed, the drafters of the Model Code appar-
ently did not consider this conflict important enough to address
explicitly.77 Because there was no clear pronouncement in the Model
72. 108 S. Ct. at 1699.
73. For more extensive discussions of this question, see United States v. Cancilla,
725 F.2d 867 (2d Cir. 1984); United States v. Martinez, 630 F.2d 361 (5th Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 450 U.S. 922 (1981); United States v.Jeffers, 520 F.2d 1256, 1265 (7th Cir,
1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1066 (1976). See generally Lowenthal, supra note 8, at
18-23 (discussing duties owed to former and current clients under rules of ethics).
74. Model Code of Professional Responsibility EC 4-6, DR 4-101 (B) (1) (1981).
75. Cf. United States v. Alberti, 470 F.2d 878, 881 (2d Cir. 1972) (client "actually
derived some advantage from the fact of [attorney's] earlier representation of [govern-
ment witness]"), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 919 (1973); Harrison v. United States, 387 F.2d
614, 615 (5th Cir. 1968) ("[a]ppellant was helped rather than harmed" by counsel's
former representation of government witness).
76. See, e.g., Fitzpatrick v. McCormick, 869 F.2d 1247, 1252 (9th Cir. 1989); Emle
Industries, Inc. v. Patentex, Inc., 478 F.2d 562, 571 (2d Cir. 1973).
77. See Goldberg, The Former Client's Disqualification Gambit: A Bad Move in
Pursuit of an Ethical Anomaly, 72 Minn. L. Rev. 227, 227 n.5, 241 (1987) (noting that
the Code deleted references to former clients that had been contained in the Canons of
Professional Ethics); see also C. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics 363 (1986) ("[I]t is not
clear that accepting a subsequent representation adverse to a former client on a substan-
tially related matter is a violation of any mandatory rule in the Code."); cf. Canons of
Professional Ethics Canon 6 (1967) ("The obligation to represent the client with undi-
vided fidelity and not to divulge his secrets or confidences forbids also the subsequent
acceptance of retainers or employment from others in matters adversely affecting any
interest of the client with respect to which confidence has been reposed.").
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Code, a substantial body of decisional law developed in civil cases in
which a party moved to disqualify former counsel from representing an
adversary. 78 The decisions were mainly premised on the attorney's eth-
ical duty to preserve the confidences of a former client, rather than
upon the conflict-of-interest provisions of the Code.79 The standard
that gained greatest currency was subsequently codified in the Model
Rules, which states that "[a] lawyer who has formerly represented a cli-
ent in a matter shall not thereafter.., represent another person in the
same or a substantially related matter in which that person's interests
are materially adverse to the interests of the former client unless the
former client consents after consultation.")80
One might think that, under this standard, an attorney for a crimi-
nal defendant is almost never required to withdraw from representing a
new client in order to avoid cross-examining a former client: the Model
Rule is directed at cases in which the former client is not only a poten-
tial witness, but also an adversary of the new client.8 ' This standard
would not, by its terms, forbid an attorney from representing a criminal
defendant in most cases in which a former client will be a witness, since
the criminal defendant's interests are rarely adverse to those of a mere
witness.8 2 However, many courts have either ignored the requirement
of adversity83 or have found that there is an adversity of interest be-
78. See, e.g., Freeman v. Chicago Musical Inst. Co., 689 F.2d 715 (7th Cir. 1982);
Duncan v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 646 F.2d 1020 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 895 (1981); Trone v. Smith, 621 F.2d 994 (9th Cir. 1980). Decisions after the
adoption of the Model Code generally built upon the common law that developed prior
to its adoption, including, most notably, Judge Weinfeld's decision in T.C. Theatre
Corp. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 113 F. Supp. 265, 267 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). See
Lowenthal, supra note 8, at 28-31; C. Wolfram, supra note 77, at 363, 368.
79. See, e.g., Trone, 621 F.2d at 998-99; Silver Chrysler Plymouth v. Chrysler Mo-
tors Corp., 518 F.2d 751, 757 (2d Cir. 1975); see generally Goldberg, supra note 77, at
241-51 (discussing case law under the Code).
80. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.9 (1983). See Goldberg, supra
note 77, at 230 (Rule 1.9 "codified the disqualification rulings of a majority of courts").
81. See Lowenthal, supra note 8, at 21-22 & n.73; see generally C. Wolfram, supra
note 77, at 366-68 (discussing requirement of adversity).
82. As a witness, the former client would generally have no personal interest at
issue in the proceeding. Compare United States v. Cunningham, 672 F.2d 1064, 1072
(2d Cir. 1982) (no precedent for disqualifying attorney who formerly represented gov-
ernment witness "solely at the behest of a person other than the former client or its
privy") with United States v. Ostrer, 597 F.2d 337, 340 (2d Cir. 1979) ("[A]llowing an
attorney to represent a client in a situation where he may use information obtained in
the course of former representation of the client's adversary gives the client an 'unfair
advantage.' ") (emphasis added). Although an exception might be made in a case where
vigorous cross-examination will reveal misconduct by the witness which had not previ-
ously been known to the authorities, it is doubtful that this is the type of adversity con-
templated by the ethical rules.
83. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Stewart v. Kelly, 870 F.2d 854, 857 (2d Cir.
1989); Fitzpatrick v. McCormick, 869 F.2d 1247, 1252 (9th Cir. 1989).
In Stewart, the Second Circuit dispensed not only with the requirement of adversity,
but also with the requirement that the current client's case be "substantially related" to
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tween the former and present clients simply because the former client
is a witness for the prosecution. 84
that of the former client. The defendant, Tineo, retained an attorney, Linn, to represent
him at a trial on narcotics charges in New York State court. At a pretrial proceeding, the
judge informed Linrl that one of the prosecution's key witnesses against Tineo would be
an informant whom Linn had previously represented in an unrelated matter. Under the
prevailing professional standards, Linn would not have been required to withdraw from
the representation, since the case was unrelated to the former client's representation,
the former client's interests did not appear to be adverse to defendant Tineo's, attorney
Linn believed that he was not in possession of any confidential information regarding
the former client, and the former client apparently did not object to Linn's representa-
tion of Tineo. The trial judge nevertheless denied Tineo's request to continue with
Linn's representation.
The federal district court issued a writ of habeas corpus, finding that Tineo had
been denied the right to counsel. The Second Circuit reversed, determining that dis-
qualification was proper under Wheat:
It is hard to conceive of a conflict of interest between clients that would not
be serious .... In the circumstances presented by this case, there can be no
doubt that Linn's potential conflict was serious, that his loyalty was divided be-
tween a client and a former client, and that representing Tineo would have
created a strong appearance of impropriety. This is no less true simply because
Linn's representation of the clients did not concern the same matter, as was the
case in Wheat. Two clients' interests in separate matters may be just as op-
posed, and the potential for conflict just as serious.
870 F.2d at 857. Notably, the court's determination was made entirely without refer-
ence to such factual considerations as the importance of the former client's testimony,
the extent of Linn's former relationship with the prosecution witness, or the nature of
any confidential information in Linn's possession. In effect, the court found that dis-
qualification is permissible whenever a former client of defense counsel will be called as
a prosecution witness.
Stewart illustrates a double standard between civil and criminal cases that courts
sometimes seem to employ. Both the New York Court of Appeals and the Second Cir-
cuit have overturned disqualification orders in civil cases that had a far more substantial
basis under the professional standards than did the order in Stewart. See, e.g.,
Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1980) (en banc), vacated, 449 U.S. 1106
(1981); S & S Hotel v. 777 S.H. Corp., 69 N.Y.2d 437, 508 N.E.2d 647, 515 N.Y.S.2d
735 (1987).
84. See, e.g., United States v. Cheshire, 707 F. Supp. 235, 239 (M.D. La. 1989)
("There is no question but that the interests of [defense counsel's] present client, Mr.
Dyer, are materially adverse to the interests of his former client, Mr. Jones, because it is
largely upon the basis of Mr.Jones' testimony that the government hopes to convict Mr.
Dyer.").
Notwithstanding the district judge's view in Cheshire, it is in fact doubtful that the
accomplice witness can be said to have an "interest" in the outcome of the trial that is
materially adverse to the defendant's interest in securing an acquittal. To be sure, the
witness may have a perceived interest that would provide a fertile basis of cross-examina-
tion. As the Second Circuit has noted:
An accomplice's testimony implicating a defendant as a perpetrator of a crime
is inherently suspect for such a witness may well have an important personal
stake in the outcome of the trial. An accomplice so testifying may believe that
the defendant's acquittal will vitiate expected rewards that may have been
either explicitly or implicitly promised him in return for his plea of guilty and
his testimony.
United States v. Padgent, 432 F.2d 701, 704 (2d Cir. 1970) (emphasis added). It does
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Even if this standard applies in criminal cases, it is clear that an
attorney may accept a case in which his former client will testify as long
as both his former client and current client consent.85 Unlike the stan-
dards governing joint representation, this standard does not identify
circumstances in which informed consent is insufficient. The more lib-
eral treatment of this potential conflict, as compared to the conflict aris-
ing out ofjoint representation, has several justifications. The potential
impact of the conflict arising from the former representation of a gov-
ernment witness is on a single, discrete aspect of the representation-
the cross-examination of that one witness. It is therefore comparatively
easy to anticipate whether a conflict will arise and to determine its effect
upon the representation.86 Moreover, it is possible to avoid any harm
not follow, however, that the witness's perceived interest or emotional stake in securing
the defendant's conviction is a genuine interest that should be recognized by Rule 1.9.
It is, in fact, the rare case in which an accomplice witness has a concrete penal or
financial stake in the outcome of a criminal case, since it generally would be unethical for
the prosecution to make its favorable treatment of the witness contingent on convicting
the defendant. See United States v. Cervantes-Pacheco, 826 F.2d 310, 316 (5th Cir.
1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 749 (1988). Thus, as prosecutors sometimes tell their
witnesses in the course of preparing for trial, and as they often remind the trial jury
during closing arguments, the accomplice witness has no interest in the result of the
trial-his only interest is in telling the truth. See Green, The Ethical Prosecutor and the
Adversary System, 24 Crim. L. Bull. 126, 144 n.62 (1988). It would be disingenuous-
but not, perhaps, unexpected-for the prosecutor in a case like Cheshire to move for
defense counsel's disqualification based on the former client's purported interest as wit-
ness, but later to argue to the jury that the witness has no interest that would cause him
to accuse the defendant falsely.
85. See Goldberg, supra note 77, at 271-72; Lowenthal, supra note 8, at 35-36; see
also Theodore v. State of New Hampshire, 614 F.2d 817, 822 (1st Cir. 1980); United
States v. Partin, 601 F.2d 1000, 1007 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 964 (1984).
Although Rule 1.9 calls for the consent of only the former client, the current client's
consent should also be required because of the possibility that his representation will be
impaired by the conflict.
Note that a case in which defense counsel is willing to cross-examine a former client
should be distinguished from a case in which,. notwithstanding the former client's con-
sent, defense counsel seeks to withdraw from the representation out of the belief that he
will be unable to cross-examine his former client vigorously. As Professor Lowenthal
has argued, some defense attorneys may feel uncomfortable about facing a former client
on the stand or using that client's confidences in cross-examining him. See Lowenthal,
supra note 8, at 51. When defense counsel's concern is genuine and not a pretext for
obtaining a mistrial, he should be permitted to withdraw from the representation.
86. In order to predict whether a conflict will arise and to determine its scope, the
defense attorney must consider the nature of the witness's testimony and the nature of
the confidences and secrets previously entrusted by the former client. If, for example,
the former client's testimony is consistent with the defendant's theory of the case, so
that there will be no need to impeach the witness, then defense counsel will not have a
conflict arising out of the need to preserve the former client's confidences. Similarly, if
the attorney does not possess confidential information that will be useful on cross-exam-
ination or if the confidential information merely duplicates the impeachment material
received from the prosecution or from other sources, then it is unlikely that the cross-
examination will be significantly curtailed. This is also likely to be true if the defense has
received other impeachment material that is so significant that there would be no need
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to the interests of either the former oi present client by carefully con-
ducting the cross-examination so as to make vigorous use of nonconfi-
dential, and only nonconfidential, information.8 7
Most importantly, the former client's consent eliminates or sub-
stantially reduces the principal dangers against which the rule protects.
If the former client's consent is regarded as a waiver of the attorney-
client privilege with respect to confidential information that is subse-
quently used on cross-examination, then the attorney has no need to
circumscribe his questioning of the witness.8 8 At minimum, the former
client's consent must be viewed as an acceptance of the risk that confi-
dences will be used inadvertently, so that defense counsel may err on
the side of disclosure. Thus, defense counsel may conduct as vigorous
a cross examination as he would if he had not represented the govern-
to utilize confidential information that would otherwise have been relevant on cross-
examination. Because the defense attorney knows the nature of confidential informa-
tion received from the former client and can generally discover what the former client's
testimony will be at trial, he can make a reasonable determination about whether his
cross-examination will be impaired.
In addition, defense counsel can assess the extent to which the representation as a
whole will be affected by a foreshortened cross-examination of the former client. If the
former client's testimony is not particularly important, the inability to cross-examine
that witness as vigorously as possible may not matter.
Defense counsel's ability to gauge the likelihood, scope and impact of a potential
conflict is important for two reasons. First, it justifies greater deference to a defense
lawyer's determination that his representation will not be impaired by a conflict of inter-
est at trial. Second, it better enables him to obtain informed consent to the potential
conflict. This is quite different from a case of joint representation at trial, which may
give rise to unforeseen conflicts or to conflicts which may have unforeseeable effects.
For discussions of the unique types of problems arising in joint representations,
see, e.g., Geer, supra note 5, at 141, 145; Lowenthal, supra note 7, at 971; Moore, supra
note 7, at 277-78; Tague, supra note 7, at 1102-03.
87. See, e.g., United States v. Cunningham, 672 F.2d 1064, 1073 & n.8 (2d Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 951 (1984). In Cunningham, the trial judge granted the
government's motion to disqualify an attorney who had formerly represented an in-
dicted coconspirator whom the government planned to call as a witness. The court of
appeals reversed, partly because it accepted the defense lawyer's assertion that he would
be able to avoid using nonpublic information in cross-examining the witness. Id. at
1071.
Because it is possible to conduct an effective cross-examination while avoiding the
use of confidential information, defendants have had difficulty demonstrating that they
were prejudiced by defense counsel's former representation of a government witness
when the potential conflict did not come to light until after trial. See Lowenthal, supra
note 8, at 26-28.
Similarly, Rule 1.9 itself seems implicitly to recognize that an attorney can avoid the
misuse of confidences while cross-examining a former client. Thus, the rule permits
representation in cases in which the former client's interests are not adverse to the pres-
ent client's as well as in cases which are not substantially related to the past representa-
tion. Although the attorney may possess confidences that would be relevant to cross-
examining the former client in such cases, the rule assumes that the lawyer will over-
come the temptation to exploit those confidences.
88. See, e.g., Partin, 601 F.2d at 1009; United States v. McClean, 528 F.2d 1250,
1258 (2d Cir. 1976).
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ment witness. While the attorney might still pull his punches out of
sympathy for the former client, this possibility ordinarily is so remote
that, if it can be regarded as a potential conflict of interest at all, it is
surely one to which an informed client should be allowed to consent.89
In light of the nature of the potential conflict in Wheat and the man-
ner in which it is addressed by the prevailing ethical standards, the dis-
trict judge in that case had no basis for concluding that, if Bravo were
to be a government witness at Wheat's trial, Iredale's representation of
Wheat would violate the prevailing ethical norms. To begin with, the
trial judge had no reason to believe that Iredale had received confiden-
tial disclosures which Iredale would have to bend over backwards to
avoid using in cross-examining Bravo. Moreover, as Justice Marshall
noted in his dissent, Iredale could have permitted cocounsel to cross-
examine Bravo, while himself conducting the remainder of the trial.
Had Iredale agreed not to reveal Bravo's confidences to his cocounsel,
this would have eliminated any possible conflict.9 0
Even if Iredale were called upon to cross-examine Bravo, the cli-
ents' consent to the potential conflict would have eliminated the ethical
barrier to the representation, notwithstanding Iredale's possession of
confidences that needed to be preserved. All three defendants had
consented to Iredale's representation of Wheat and had agreed to
waive any conflict-of-interest claims. 9 1 The professional standards ap-
plicable in California, like the Model Code and the Model Rules, al-
lowed the representation of conflicting interests with client consent.9 2
Moreover, unlike cases involving joint representation at trial, the con-
sent in this case would have eliminated not only the ethical barrier, but
the conflict itself. By authorizing Iredale to make use of his confi-
dences, or at least to err on the side of using them, Bravo would have
eliminated any danger to Wheat's defense. 93 At the same time, Wheat
89. See, e.g., Fiumara v. United States, 727 F.2d 209, 211-12 (2d Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 466 U.S. 951 (1984).
90. See 108 S. Ct. at 1703 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also infra note 243 and
accompanying text. Justice Marshall's dissent did not otherwise consider whether pro-
fessional norms would have proscribed Iredale's cross-examination of Wheat. Instead,
Justice Marshall emphasized that there was only a remote possibility that Bravo would
give damaging testimony at Wheat's trial. As he recognized, the potential conflict iden-
tified by the district court when it barred Iredale from participating in Wheat's defense
was premised on a series of contingencies, the most important being that Bravo would
be called as a government witness to give testimony that needed to be challenged on
cross-examination. It was extremely unlikely that this would occur, since Bravo did not
even know Wheat, and was therefore unable to tie Wheat to the narcotics conspiracy.
108 S. Ct. at 1702-03 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
91. 108 S. Ct. at 1695.
92. See California Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 5-102(B) (1975) ("A mem-
ber of the State Bar shall not represent conflicting interests, except with the written
consent of all parties concerned."); see also supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text
(discussing Model Code and Model Rules).
93. Cf. United States v. Cunningham, 672 F.2d 1064, 1073 (2d Cir. 1982) ("While
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could have agreed that, insofar as possible, Iredale's cross-examination
of Bravo would be based only on nonconfidential matters; in doing so,
Wheat would simply forego the unfair advantage that would otherwise
result from having hired the lawyer for a government witness-an ad-
vantage which Wheat could never have obtained with another lawyer.94
Thus, the Wheat decision is bottomed on the Court's misunder-
standing of the ethical rules. If Iredale obtained the informed consent
of Wheat and his codefendants, there was virtually no possibility that
his representation of Wheat would have violated the prevailing ethical
norms. As a consequence of the Court's misunderstanding, the Court
upheld the denial of Wheat's choice of counsel in a case where the ethi-
cal rules plainly would have permitted that choice.95
[the government witness] does not waive his right to assert his attorney-client privilege
with regard to [his former attorney], neither [the witness] nor his counsel views the risk
of an intrusion into that privilege as substantial enough to justify endorsing the govern-
ment's motion for disqualification."), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 951 (1984).
Had Bravo not consented to Iredale's representation of Wheat, the argument for
disqualification would have been more persuasive. In deciding whether to disqualify
Iredale, the court would then have been compelled to consider not only thejudiciary's
interests, but also those asserted by Bravo. See, e.g., United States v. O'Malley, 786
F.2d 786, 790, 792-93 (7th Cir. 1986); United States v. James, 708 F,2d 40, 44-45 (2d
Cir. 1983); United States v. Perez, 694 F. Supp. 854, 857-58 (S.D. Fla. 1988). Bravo's
interests would have been particularly strong because he was a present, not former,
client of Iredale. He could reasonably have argued that it would be an act of unfairness
or disloyalty for his current lawyer to cross-examine him, even without exploiting confi-
dential communications. This concern was, of course, eliminated when Bravo consented
to Iredale's representation of Wheat.
94. That Bravo was still a client of Iredale was important in one respect: It meant
that, while preparing Wheat's case for trial, Iredale would be advising Bravo with regard
to his testimony as a government witness at Wheat's trial. This would create a potential
conflict. For example, it would be in Wheat's interest for Bravo to avoid inculpating
Wheat directly or otherwise harm Wheat's defense. On the other hand, if Bravo inten-
tionally gave false testimony, he would be subject to criminal prosecution for perjury,
whereas if he cooperated willingly and truthfully against Wheat, he might later receive
the government's endorsement of a motion to reduce his sentence. Thus, in advising
Bravo concerning his upcoming testimony, Iredale would have a conflict between serv-
ing the interests of Bravo and serving those of Wheat, but only if Bravo's truthful testi-
mony would in fact inculpate Wheat. This was not the case; to the contrary, it was
undisputed that Bravo had never had dealings with Wheat. In any event, this was a
potential conflict to which informed consent could be given if Iredale determined, as he
apparently did, that his representation of both Wheat and Bravo would not be impaired
by the potential conflict. See supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
95. See The Supreme Court, 1987 Term, supra note 3, at 186 n.51.
The Court's misunderstanding of the prevailing professional standards has not
been limited to the area of conflicts of interest. In criminal cases, the Court has relied
on questionable or overstated constructions of other professional standards governing
the conduct of criminal defense attorneys. See Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 168
(1986) (finding that "both the Model Code and the Model Rules do not merely authorize
disclosure by counsel of client perjury; they require such disclosure"); Jones v. Barnes,
463 U.S. 745, 753 n.6 (1983) (finding that, except for the decision whether to plead
guilty, to waive ajury trial, or to testify, all "strategic and tactical decisions are the exclu-
sive province of the defense counsel"). This may simply reflect the Court's lack of inter-
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B. Defense Counsel's Role in Maintaining Ethical Standards
Prior to Wheat, the Supreme Court and lower federal courts tradi-
tionally professed faith that most.defense attorneys would uphold the
general ethical standards of the legal profession,96 and, in particular,
the standards governing conflicts of interest.97 For example, in both
Holloway v. Arkansas98 and Cuyler v. Sullivan,99 the Supreme Court inter-
preted the trial judge's role with reference to the expectation that law-
yers will conduct themselves ethically.
In Holloway, the trial court appointed one attorney to represent
three indigent defendants at a joint trial on charges of robbery and
rape. Before the trial began, the trial judge denied the defense attor-
ney's request that separate lawyers be appointed to represent each of
the defendants who, counsel asserted, had conflicting interests. At
trial, defense counsel called all three defendants to testify, but com-
plained-again failing to evoke a sympathetic response-that he could
not elicit testimony from one client while protecting the interests of the
other two. All three defendants were convicted. On appeal, the
Arkansas Supreme Court concluded that the defendants had not been
deprived of their sixth amendment right to counsel. Emphasizing that
the defense attorney never explained to the trial judge precisely how
the defendants' interests differed, the court concluded that the record
failed to establish that defense counsel had an actual conflict of
interest.100
The Supreme Court reversed, adopting the view shared by most
lower courts that when a defense lawyer, "as an officer of the court,"
represents that he has a conflict of interest, separate counsel should be
est in giving close scrutiny to provisions of lawyers' codes which are drafted by the
American Bar Association and adopted by state courts, and concerning which the Court
has no authority to issue binding interpretations. See Whiteside, 475 U.S. at 176
(Brennan, J., concurring); G. Hazard & W. Hodes, supra note 61, at 360.2-.2-1 (1988
Supp.). On the other hand, this may reflect the desire of some members of the Court to
influence the interpretation of the ethical rules by state courts and advisory committees
of the bar.
96. See, e.g., McKinney v. Meese, 831 F.2d 728, 731 (7th Cir. 1987); Friedman v.
Supreme Court of Virginia, 822 F.2d 423, 429 (4th Cir. 1987), aff'd, 108 S. Ct. 2260
(1988). Likewise, the federal judiciary presumed that defense attorneys acted compe-
tently. See, e.g., Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 437 (1983); Henderson v.
Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 647 (1976).
97. See, e.g., Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 485 (1978), discussed infra notes
100-103 and accompanying text; Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 346-47 (1980), dis-
cussed infra notes 104-110 and accompanying text; United States v. Jeffers, 520 F.2d
1256, 1265 (7th Cir. 1975) (recognizing "the presumption that the lawyer will
subordinate his pecuniary interests and honor his primary professional responsibility to
his clients"), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1066 (1976).
98. 435 U.S. 475.
99. 446 U.S. 335.
100. See Holloway v. State, 260 Ark. 250, 255-57, 539 S.W.2d 435, 438-39 (1976).
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appointed to represent jointly charged defendants.' 0 ' The Court re-
jected the State's argument that it would be inappropriate, in effect, to
"transfer[] to defense counsel the authority of the trial judge to rule on
the existence or risk of a conflict," because "unscrupulous defense at-
torneys might abuse their 'authority.' "102 The Court referred to three
interrelated considerations, each of which turned on the defense attor-
ney's ethical obligation:
[First, a]n "attorney representing two defendants in a criminal
matter is in the best position professionally and ethically to
determine when a conflict of interest exists or will probably
develop in the course of a trial." . . . Second, defense attor-
neys have the obligation, upon discovering a conflict of inter-
ests, to advise the court at once of the problem .... Finally,
attorneys are officers of the court, and " 'ivhen they address
the judge solemnly upon a matter before the court, their dec-
larations are virtually made under oath.' ,,103
Two years later, in Cuyler v. Sullivan,10 4 the Court again defined the
trial judge's responsibilities with reference to the responsibilities of de-
fense counsel. In that case, counsel's potential conflict was patent, in-
asmuch as Sullivan's retained counsel also represented two of Sullivan's
codefendants. 10 5 However, counsel did not move to withdraw, and the
trial judge did not initiate an inquiry to determine whether the conflict
was real or whether the defendant would formally waive any potential
conflict. The Court found that when a defense attorney apprises a trial
judge of an actual conflict or when the judge himself "knows or reason-
ably should know that a particular conflict exists," the trial judge has a
duty to conduct a hearing to determine whether the defendant will
knowingly and voluntarily waive his constitutional right to an independ-
ent attorney. 106 However, where he does not and reasonably could not
know that the codefendants' interests are in conflict, a trial judge has
no constitutional duty "to initiate inquiries into the propriety of multi-
ple representation."'' 0 7 Instead, a trial judge may rely on defense coun-
sel to carry out his ethical responsibility to avoid potential conflicts to
which his client has not consented. The Court explained:
Defense counsel have an ethical obligation to avoid conflicting
representations and to advise the court promptly when a con-
flict of interest arises during the course of trial. Absent special
circumstances, therefore, trial courts may assume either that
101. 446 U.S. at 485.
102. Id. at 486.
103. Id. at 485-86 (citations omitted).
104. 446 U.S. 335 (1980).
105. See id. at 348 ("[A] possible conflict inheres in almost every instance of multi-
ple representation ...."); accord Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 783 (1987); United
States v. Renda, 669 F. Supp. 1544, 1547 (D. Kan. 1987).
106. 446 U.S. at 347.
107. Id. at 346.
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multiple representation entails no conflict or that the lawyer
and his clients knowingly accept such risk of conflict as may
exist.... [T]rial courts necessarily rely in large measure upon
the good faith and good judgment of defense counsel.108
Thus, in determining that the judiciary's independent obligation to
safeguard the sixth amendment rights of the criminal accused does not
encompass a responsibility to inquire into potential conflicts of inter-
est, 10 9 the Court relied heavily on the expectation that defense attor-
108. Id. at 346-47 (citations omitted). At the same time, the Sullivan Court ac-
knowledged that several federal courts of appeals, pursuant to their supervisory author-
ity, required trial judges to inquire into potential conflicts of interest in cases involving
multiple representation. Id. at 346 n.10 (citing First, Second, and Eighth Circuit cases);
see also United States v. White, 706 F.2d 506, 509 (5th Cir. 1983); United States v.
LaRiche, 549 F.2d 1088, 1095 n.5 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 987 (1977); United
States v. Gaines, 529 F.2d 1038, 1044 (7th Cir. 1976). The Sullivan Court noted that this
was a "desirable practice." 446 U.S. at 346 n.10. Shortly after the Sullivan decision,
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 44(c) was amended to require the federal district
judge, in all cases ofjoint representation, to inquire into any potential conflicts of inter-
est before trial, to advise the defendant of his right to separate representation, and to
take other appropriate measures to protect the defendant's right to counsel. This rule
does not require any inquiry into potential conflicts other than those arising out ofjoint
representation. See Cerro v. United States, 872 F.2d 780, 786-87 (7th Cir. 1989). Nor
does it apply in state courts. See Moore v. Morris, 663 F. Supp. 677, 681 (W.D. Mo.
1987) (urging Missouri Supreme Court to "give appropriate consideration to whether,
in the exercise of its supervisory power, it should adopt a rule similar to that of the
amended federal Rule 44(c)").
109. One year after Sullivan, the Court issued an opinion which appears to expand
the trial court's duty by requiring judges to inquire not only into actual conflicts, but
also into potential conflicts. See Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261 (1981). The defend-
ants in that case, employees of a pornographic movie theater and a book store, were
represented by an attorney who had been hired and paid by their employer. The de-
fendants were convicted of distributing obscene materials, placed on probation, and or-
dered to pay $5000 fines in installments of $500 per month. When the defendants failed
to make the required payments, the state court revoked their probation, rejecting the
defendants' argument that it was a denial of equal protection to imprison them for fail-
ing to pay fines that they could not afford.
The Supreme Court found, sua sponte, that the receipt of a fee from the defend-
ants' employer created a possible conflict of interest for defense counsel, who might
have been inclined to serve the interests of the employer at the expense of the defend-
ants. Id. at 267 ("IT]he risk of conflict of interest in this situation is evident."); see also
Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 5-107(A)(1) (1981); Model Rules of Pro-
fessional Conduct Rule 1.8(f) (1983). For example, the lawyer might have initially re-
frained from vigorously opposing the imposition of heavy fines because he wanted the
opportunity later to establish a legal precedent that would benefit the employer. 450
U.S. at 267, 270. Although the Court had granted certiorari in order to decide the peti-
tioners' equal protection claim, id. at 264, the Court instead reversed the revocation of
probation on the grounds that the judge failed to conduct an inquiry as required by
Sullivan. Id. at 272-73 & n. 18. According to the Court, the trial judge should have
known that a possible conflict existed since, at the revocation proceedings, the State's
attorney asked the court to conduct an inquiry and to appoint separate counsel for the
defendants. Id.
The Wood Court directed the state court to determine on remand whether a conflict
of interest actually existed at the time of the revocation hearing and, if so, whether the
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neys will generally comply with the ethical rules governing conflicts of
interest." I 0
The assumption that defense counsel will comply with clearly de-
fined ethical standards governing conflicts of interest would have
weighed heavily against disqualifying defense counsel in Wheat. As the
Court recognized in Holloway, defense counsel is invariably more famil-
iar with the criminal accusations, the government's evidence, and his
client's own defense than is the trialjudge. He is, therefore, better situ-
ated than the trial judge to determine whether the representation of
multiple defendants would entail a conflict of interest." ' Indeed, the
defense attorney in Wheat would have been much better able to assess
the potential for conflict than would the attorney in Holloway, in which
codefendants were represented jointly at trial.' 12 If one accepts the as-
defendants had validly waived their right to independent counsel. Id. at 273-74. The
Court purported to be applying, and not expanding, the holding of Sullivan, see id. at
272 n.18, and some courts have accepted that interpretation of Wood. See, e.g., Cerro,
872 F.2d at 783. However, the decision is better understood as an expansion of the trial
court's duty to inquire, since the trial judge in Wood, like the trial judge in Sullivan, had
been aware of no more than the possibility of a conflict of interest. See, e.g., United
States v. Taylor, 657 F.2d 92, 94 (6th Cir.) ("The recent Supreme Court decision in
Woody. Georgia ... indicates that where a possibility of a conflict of interest on the part of
counsel in a criminal case is sufficiently shown, a duty is imposed upon a trial court to
inquire further."), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1086 (1981). Even if Wood leaves some uncer-
tainty regarding the scope of the trial court's constitutional responsibility, it leaves little
doubt that, if only as a matter of prudence, a trial judge should always inquire into
potential conflicts.
110. A majority of the Court recently reaffirmed its faith in the defense bar, noting
that "we generally presume that the lawyer is fully conscious of the overarching duty of
complete loyalty to his or her client." Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 784 (1987). The
Court identified this presumption as one of its reasons for concluding that the defense
attorneys in Burger did not have an actual conflict of interest. Id. See also Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (sixth amendment relies upon "legal profession's
maintenance of standards sufficient to justify the law's presumption that counsel will
fulfill the role in the adversary process that the Amendment envisions").
111. See Holloway, 435 U.S. at 485; see also United States v. Aiello, 814 F.2d 109,
110 (2d Cir. 1987) ("[D]efense counsel are best positioned to know when a conflict
exists or will likely develop during the course of trial .... ").
In some cases, however, the court may be in a position to facilitate defense coun-
sel's determination. For example, where the likelihood of a conflict depends on the
content of a government witness's testimony, the court can order the government to
make pretrial disclosure of the witness's expected testimony. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 44(c)
advisory committee's note ("[E]ven the most diligent attorney may be unaware of facts
giving rise to a potential conflict, so it is not enough to rely on counsel in making a
determination concerning a conflict of interest.").
112. When the potential conflict arises out of the need to cross-examine a former
client, a defense lawyer is generally well-suited to gauge the nature and dimensions of
the conflict. See supra note 86. In Wheat, moreover, defense attorney Iredale was even
better situated because he would be cross-examining a current client. Since Iredale had
continuing access to Bravo, the government witness, he would be in a unique position to
determine the extent to which Bravo's testimony would implicate Wheat, and thus, the
extent to which Bravo would need to be impeached.
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sumption that trial counsel will act ethically in making this assessment,
a trial judge would ordinarily have little if any justification for second-
guessing a defense attorney who did not believe that an actual conflict
would impair his performance at trial.
In Wheat, however, the Court stood the traditional assumption on
its head. The Court described the difficulties that confront an attorney
who contemplates undertaking the representation of codefendants, in-
cluding the difficulty of acquiring all of the facts needed to assess the
likelihood and dimensions of a potential conflict and the difficulty of
explaining this assessment "to a criminal defendant untutored in the
niceties of legal ethics."' "13 The Court then stated somewhat enigmati-
cally: "Nor is it amiss to observe that the willingness of an attorney to
obtain such waivers from his clients may bear an inverse relation to the
care with which he conveys all the necessary information to them."'"14
Inspired, perhaps, by the Ninth Circuit's decision in Wheat, which ex-
pressed some skepticism about whether economically self-interested
defense attorneys can be relied on to avoid conflicting interests," 15 the
Supreme Court seemingly has gone even farther. The Court seems to
assume that any attorney who, rather than declining multiple represen-
tation, accepts the representation upon his clients' consent to potential
conflicts is more likely than other lawyers to be unethical.
The Court's rejection of its previously optimistic assumption about
the conduct of defense lawyers is not entirely without foundation. In
general, two principal criticisms may be leveled at the general expecta-
tion that defense counsel will carry out an ethical obligation to avoid
conflicting interests. First, there is the possibility that many defense
attorneys may be either unaware of the ethical standards governing
conflicts of interest or insensitive to the existence of potential conflicts
when they arise. The Supreme Court itself suggested these possibilities
in Sullivan, when it observed that "[t]he private bar may be less alert
[than public defenders] to the importance of avoiding multiple repre-
sentation in criminal cases."' 1' 6 In his dissenting opinion in Burger v.
113. 108 S. Ct. at 1699.
114. Id.
115. 813 F.2d 1399, 1403 (9th Cir. 1987) (" 'Because the conflicts are often subtle
it is not enough to rely upon counsel, who may not be totally disinterested .... "
(quoting United States v. Lawriw, 568 F.2d 98, 104 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435
U.S. 969 (1978))), aff'd, 108 S. Ct. 1692 (1988).
116. 446 U.S. at 346-47 n.l 1 (citing commentators).
The defense bar's susceptibility to conflicts of interest cuts across all types of crimi-
nal cases. It is not uncommon in organized crime cases, for example, for a defense
lawyer to represent one defendant while receiving payment from a different defendant
or target. See, e.g., United States v. Aiello, 814 F.2d 109 (2d Cir. 1987); United States v.
Padilla-Martinez, 762 F.2d 942 (11 th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 952 (1985); see also
Lowenthal, supra note 7, at 960-61. Similarly, in white-collar criminal cases, it is not
uncommon for corporations that are targets of grand jury investigations to hire attor-
neys to represent corporate employees in the grand jury. See, e.g., Cohen, Issue of
Lawyer's Loyalty Is Raised By Drexel Employee's Conviction, Wall St.J., Mar. 24, 1989,
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Kemp,1 17 Justice Blackmun reprised this concern, which he found to be
supported in that case by defense counsel's testimony "that he never
even considered that a conflict might arise out of the representation of
two defendants facing the death penalty for the commission of the same
murder."118
Second, even assuming that attorneys are generally aware of the
prevailing ethical norms, a retained attorney's financial stake in the rep-
resentation may create a disincentive to comply with the particular stan-
dards governing conflicts. Because he will lose a fee if he is forced to
relinquish a client in order to avoid a conflict of interest, an attorney
has an incentive, consciously or unconsciously, to ignore the full scope
of a potential conflict or to play down its significance when counselling
the accused."19
For these reasons, the Wheat Court would have been justified in
concluding that no assumptions could fairly be made about the good
faith of defense attorneys who have potential conflicts of interest.
Moreover, even if such assumptions can be made, the Court could rea-
sonably have concluded that such assumptions should not be the basis
for fashioning constitutional rules. The Court might have acknowl-
edged that its past expressions of faith in the defense bar probably had
no real impact on the decisions in the earlier cases. Certainly, in most
cases, defense counsel's presumptively proper conduct is invoked
merely as a rhetorical trope when a court decides to reject a claim that
defense counsel committed some misconduct which necessitates a new
trial. 120
N Rather than recognizing that it is inappropriate to rely on general-
izations about the ethical probity of defense attorneys, the Wheat Court
interpreted the sixth amendment right to counsel narrowly in light of
its assumption that defense attorneys will act unethically by failing to
instruct their clients carefully concerning waivers of conflicts of inter-
est. Yet Wheat seems like a curious case in which to disavow one's faith
in defense counsel, since there was much more reason to rely on coun-
sel to act ethically in Wheat than there had been in Sullivan, where the
Court reaffirmed its faith.
In Sullivan, unlike Wheat, the reason for defense counsel's failure to
call to the trial court's attention the potential conflict arising out of his
§ 2, at 3, col. 5 (employee of Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc. represented by company's
counsel before grand jury that was investigating company was subsequently convicted of
lying to grand jury and obstructing justice).
117. 483 U.S. 776 (1987).
118. Id. at 797 n.2 (Blackmun,J., dissenting).
119. See Lowenthal, supra note 7, at 961-63, 966-67.
120. For example, in ineffective assistance of counsel cases, courts frequently refer
to the presumption that defense counsel acted competently. See, e.g., Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690 (1984) ("[T]he court should recognize that counsel is
strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and made all significant deci-
sions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment.").
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representation of codefendants was ambiguous. Counsel, complying
with the ethical standards, might have concluded that the defendants'
interests would not conflict and properly obtained his clients' informed
consent to the multiple representation; on the other extreme, counsel
might also have deliberately disregarded his ethical obligations. Coun-
sel's silence also might have been the result of an inadvertent failure to
comply with the prevailing professional norms. For example, counsel
may not have been aware of an ethical obligation regarding conflicts of
interest; he may not have recognized the conflict inherent in the multi-
ple representation; or he may not have understood the extent of his
duty to investigate and assess the likelihood of the conflict and to ob-
tain informed consent from his clients.
In contrast, in a case in which the prosecution seeks to disqualify
defense counsel, like Wheat, the attention of both attorney and client is
called to the attorney's ethical responsibility. By questioning, the trial
judge can obtain assurances that the attorney has investigated the pos-
sibility of conflicts, made an assessment that no conflict would arise,
and carefully explained that assessment to his client. Under these cir-
cumstances, the possibility that counsel will deliberately or inadver-
tently disregard his ethical responsibilities is greatly diminished. 12 1
Moreover, in deciding whether to consent to multiple representa-
tion and to accept the risks created by the potential conflicts that result,
a defendant can receive the advice of an independent attorney who
does not himself have a conflict and who will not benefit financially
from the defendant's waiver. As Justice Stevens pointed out in his dis-
sent, this was true of Wheat, who had received advice about the wisdom
of his waiver from his original attorney. 12 2 An independent attorney is
in a far better position than the trial judge to assess the likelihood of a
conflict.1 23 Not only is he disinterested, but he has access to informa-
tion about the defense that could not ordinarily be acquired by the trial
judge without invading the attorney-client privilege.
For these reasons, the Wheat Court took a step backward in decid-
ing to limit the scope of a defendant's right to counsel of choice based
in part on an assumption that attorneys representing multiple defend-
ants cannot be trusted to comply with the ethical standards. First, the
Court should not have made a constitutional rule on the basis of any
121. Under the particular facts of Wheat, it would have been especially appropriate
to -assume that Iredale was complying with the ethical rules. Wheat was not a case in
which the legal fees of a low-level member of a narcotics conspiracy were paid by the
lead defendant. In that case, there would be cause for concern that defense counsel
would serve the interests of the lead defendant rather than his client. Here, Wheat
sought out and retained Iredale, whose other clients, like Wheat, apparently were not
the principal defendants in the conspiracy.
122. 108 S. Ct. at 1704 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also United States v. Curcio,
680 F.2d 881 (2d Cir. 1982) (court should allow reasonable time for defendant to make
decision, including time to consult chosen counsel and independent counsel).
123. See supra note I11.
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generalization concerning the ethics of the defense bar. And, second, if
any generalization was appropriate, it was not the one on which the
Court relied. The Court assumed that, unlike the presumptively ethical
defense lawyer in Sullivan, an attorney in Iredale's situation was likely to
be unethical. Yet Wheat, in which the trial judge was required to rule on
a disqualification motion, was the paradigmatic case for assuming that
the codefendants' attorney is complying with the rules governing con-
flicts of interest.
C. The Attorney-Client Relationship
The decisions of both the Supreme Court and the lower federal
courts prior to Wheat reflected concern for preserving the attorney-cli-
ent relationship coupled with a recognition that a trial judge's inquiry
into a potential conflict of interest could threaten the effectiveness of
that relationship. The Court first expressed its concern in Holloway.
The Court cautioned that, while a trial judge was free to "explor[e] the
adequacy of the basis of defense counsel's representations regarding a
conflict of interests," such an inquiry must be conducted "without im-
properly requiring disclosure of the confidential communications of the
client."' 24 In a separate opinion in Cuyler v. Sullivan, Justice Marshall
suggested that trial judges should exercise similar restraint when in-
quiring into the adequacy of waivers of conflict-of-interest claims. He
emphasized "[t]he dangers of infringing the defendants' privilege
against self-incrimination and their right to maintain the confidentiality
of the defense strategy." 125
In another right-to-counsel case, Strickland v. Washington, 128 the
Court gave fuller expression to this concern. In that case, decided four
years after Sullivan, the Court was called upon to determine the scope
of the sixth amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. The
Court held that in cases in which, in the absence of a conflict of interest,
defense counsel allegedly provided inadequate assistance, "the proper
standard for attorney performance is that of reasonably effective assist-
ance .... [T]he defendant must show that counsel's representation fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness"' 127 and that counsel's
errors "actually had an adverse effect on the defense."' 128 This stan-
dard was intended to be difficult to meet, said the Court, in order to
discourage post-trial judicial inquiries into the competence of counsel,
which ultimately could work to the detriment of the interest in afford-
ing effective representation to criminal defendants:
Counsel's performance and even willingness to serve could be
124. 435 U.S. at 487.
125. 446 U.S. at 354 n.I (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part);
accord Margolin & Coliver, supra note 26, at 228.
126. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
127. Id. at 687-88.
128. Id. at 693.
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adversely affected [by the proliferation of hearings concerning
the effectiveness of counsel]. Intensive scrutiny of counsel...
could dampen the ardor and impair the independence of de-
fense counsel, discourage the acceptance of assigned cases,
and undermine the trust between attorney and client. 129
The Wheat decision implicitly rejected, or at least minimized the
significance of, the Court's earlier concern for the sanctity of the attor-
ney-client relationship. By upholding a trial judge's discretion to dis-
qualify an attorney when there is "a showing of a serious potential for
conflict," 130 the Court implicitly authorized trial judges to undertake an
inquiry that potentially imperils the defendant's ultimate interest in re-
ceiving the effective assistance of counsel.
The factual inquiry that must be undertaken to decide whether to
disqualify a defense attorney is far more intrusive than the inquiry that
must be conducted to determine whether a defendant's waiver is know-
ing and voluntary. To ensure that a defendant's waiver of conflict-free
representation is a knowing one, the trial judge generally is not re-
quired personally to advise the defendant in detail about the likelihood
that a conflict will arise and about its potential impact on the defense.
The trial judge need only explain to the defendant, in the abstract, the
types of problems inherent in being represented by an attorney who
has a potential conflict, allow defense counsel an opportunity to discuss
the potential conflict with the defendant in greater detail, and deter-
mine whether the defendant desires to continue with his present attor-
ney. 131 For example, in United States v. Curcio,132 the Second Circuit
exercised its supervisory authority to prescribe the following specific
steps for a district judge to take when he becomes aware of a potential
conflict:
[T]he court should advise the defendant of the right to sepa-
rate and conflict free representation, instruct the defendant as
129. Id. at 690. The Court went on to note that hearings concerning conflicts of
interest were different from hearings concerning the competence of counsel, because of
"the ability of trial courts to make early inquiry in certain situations likely to give rise to
conflicts." Id. at 692. The Court's observation, while endorsing pretrial inquiries into a
defense lawyer's potential conflict of interest, also suggested that, in the Court's view,
hearings concerning potential conflicts of interest could be conducted unobtrusively,
unlike the post-trial proceedings necessitated by an ineffective assistance of counsel
claim.
130. 108 S. Ct. at 1700.
131. See, e.g., United States v. Roth, 860 F.2d 1382, 1388-89 (7th Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 109 S. Ct. 2099 (1989); United States v. Williams, 809 F.2d 1072, 1085 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 228, 259, 506 (1987); In re Paradyne Corp., 803 F.2d 604,
611 (11th Cir. 1986); United States v. Curcio, 680 F.2d 881, 888-90 (2d Cir. 1982); cf.
United States v. Agosto, 675 F.2d 965, 975-76 (8th Cir.) (finding that district court
erred in overriding defendant's waiver based on inability to foresee conflicts), cert. de-
nied, 459 U.S. 834 (1982); Tague, supra note 7, at 1112-13 (suggesting that court may
not constitutionally override informed defendant's waiver of separate representation).
132. 680 F.2d 881.
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to problems inherent in being represented by an attorney with
divided loyalties, allow the defendant to confer with his chosen
counsel, encourage the defendant to seek advice from in-
dependent counsel, and allow a reasonable time for the de-
fendant to make his decision.133
This circumspect inquiry can be explained, in part, by the judici-
ary's administrative interest in avoiding a burdensome fact-finding,' 34
and perhaps also by its expectation that defense attorneys will carry out
their ethical responsibility to give the accused appropriate advice. 135
But an additional virtue is that this approach avoids intruding on the
attorney-client relationship. In order to give more detailed advice, the
trial court would first have to elicit a substantial amount of otherwise
confidential information from the defense. 136 For example, in a case in
which defense counsel formerly represented a government witness, the
court might have to ascertain not only the scope and importance of the
witness's prospective testimony and the nature and extent of any attor-
ney-client confidences received from the witness by defense counsel,
but also the extent to which the testimony will be contrary to the de-
fendant's theory of the case. This fact-finding would potentially com-
promise privileged communications, undermine the defendant's faith
in his attorney, and chill the attorney's enthusiasm for the case. Courts
have appropriately entrusted this inquiry to defense counsel, rather
than undertaking it themselves,' 37 since such an inquiry could inadver-
133. Id. at 890.
134. In a case involving the representation of codefendants, such an inquiry might
be so burdensome that, for practical purposes, it could not be undertaken. See United
States v. Garafola, 428 F. Supp. 620, 624 (D.N.J. 1977) ("Respectfully it is submitted
that the trial judge cannot conduct a meaningful inquiry. He does not know the case.
He does not know the facts or the inferences which may be fairly drawn from them. He
is unaware of the quality of the witnesses and the trial strategy the government and the
defendant will pursue.").
135. Before accepting a waiver of conflict-free representation, courts sometimes re-
quire both the defense attorney and the defendant to affirm on the record that the de-
fendant did in fact receive detailed advice from his attorney. See, e.g., United States v.
Bradshaw, 719 F.2d 907, 912 (7th Cir. 1983).
136. See United States v. Garafola, 428 F. Supp. 620, 624 (D.N.J. 1977);
Lowenthal, supra note 7, at 981-82; C. Wolfram, supra note 77, at 417.
137. See supra notes 131-133 and accompanying text.
A minority of courts have declined to rely on defense counsel and, instead, con-
cluded that trial judges should assume a greater responsibility for ensuring that the de-
fendant understands the consequences of continuing with counsel's representation.
See, e.g., Gray v. Estelle, 616 F.2d 801, 803-04 (5th Cir. 1980) (extensive inquiry is not
necessary to establish a constitutionally sufficient waiver, but such an inquiry has never-
theless been required of district judges pursuant to the appellate court's supervisory
authority). Some trial judges have conducted hearings to determine whether the de-
fendant has actually been apprised in sufficient detail about his attorney's possible con-
flict and its potential dangers, and whether he has a sufficient understanding, to enable
him to make a meaningful decision to proceed with his present attorney. See, e.g.,
United States v. Padilla-Martinez, 762 F.2d 942, 946-49 (11 th Cir.), cert. denied, 474
U.S. 952 (1985); United States v. Renda, 669 F. Supp. 1544, 1550-51 (D. Kan. 1987); cf.
1232 [Vol. 89:1201
DISQUALIFICATION MOTIONS
tently undermine the very right to counsel it is intended to protect.
Proceedings precipitated by a disqualification motion entail sub-
stantially greater intrusion into the attorney-client relationship than
proceedings concerning the validity of a defendant's waiver. As the
Wheat Court observed, the likelihood of a potential conflict is hard to
predict even for a defense attorney who possesses far more information
than the trialjudge.' 38 The trial judge ruling on a disqualification mo-
tion would have to acquire the same sort of information that defense
counsel would use to make his assessment, without which the judge
would scarcely be justified in substituting his own assessment for that of
the defense attorney. Moreover, unless he conducted a probing inquiry
to garner all of the facts relevant to ascertaining whether there is a "se-
rious potential for conflict," the judge's decision would not be "in-
formed," as required by Wheat, 13 9 but would be unduly speculative.' 40
Such an inquiry, however, threatens precisely the interests that led
the Court to conclude in Strickland v. Washington that hearings regarding
the competence of counsel are disfavored.14' The judicial inquiry may
undermine the defendant's confidence in his attorney by causing him to
question whether defense counsel is qualified to provide a vigorous de-
fense. It may also threaten the effectiveness of counsel's representation
by dampening counsel's ardor. And, unless the trial judge receives in-
formation from defense counsel ex parte or precludes the prosecution
from making evidentiary and investigative use of defense counsel's rep-
resentations to the court, a hearing on a disqualification motion may
result in the disclosure of otherwise confidential information, which
may then be used by the prosecutor against the defendant. The Wheat
decision's failure to address these concerns, and its adoption of an anal-
ysis which substantially discounts them, reflects the Court's abandon-
ment of the wisdom of its prior decisions.
D. The Autonomy of the Individual Defendant
In cases prior to Wheat, the Court recognized that the judiciary
must accord deference to a criminal defendant's choices concerning
United States v. Welty, 674 F.2d 185, 189 (3d Cir. 1982) (when defendant seeks to waive
right to counsel and proceed to trial pro se, " '[a] judge can make certain that an ac-
cused's professed waiver of counsel is understandingly and wisely made only from a
penetrating and comprehensive examination of all the circumstances'" (quoting Von
Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 724 (1948))).
138. 108 S. Ct. at 1699.
139. 108 S. Ct. at 1700 ("The evaluation of the facts and circumstances of each case
... must be left primarily to the informed judgment of the trial court.").
140. See, e.g., United States v. Reese, 699 F.2d 803, 805 (6th Cir. 1983); United
States v. Renda, 669 F. Supp. 1544, 1547 (D. Kan. 1987) ("To the extent that the trial
judge is not fully apprised of the details of the case and the facts and circumstances to be
drawn therefrom, it is unrealistic to believe that an accurate prediction concerning a
conflict of interest can be made with any degree of certainty.").
141. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689-90, 693 (1984).
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matters of significance to his defense. In Glasser, for example, the
Supreme Court deferred to a defendant's decision not to accept an at-
torney with divided loyalties, stating: "Glasser wished the benefit of
the undivided assistance of counsel of his own choice. We think that
such a desire on the part of an accused should be respected.' 42
The Supreme Court relied more extensively on this concern for
the autonomy of the accused in Faretta v. California,143 which held that a
criminal defendant's voluntary, informed choice to waive the right to
counsel and to represent himself at trial must be honored. The deci-
sion was based in large part on a historical analysis of the sixth amend-
ment and on the language of the "assistance of counsel" guarantee, 144
as well as on the recognition that self-representation may enable the
defendant to present his case more effectively.145 But the Court also
emphasized that "[t]o force a lawyer" on an unwilling defendant would
deny him "'that respect for the individual which is the lifeblood of the
law.' "146 As the Court observed, "whatever else may be said of those
who wrote the Bill of Rights, surely there can be no doubt that they
understood the inestimable worth of free choice."1 47
These cases provided strong support for the argument that when a
criminal defendant decides to be represented by an attorney who has a
potential conflict of interest, respect for the autonomy of the individual
defendant should counsel a court to uphold that decision. Thus, in his
dissenting opinion in Wheat, Justice Stevens chides the Court for its
142. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 75 (1942).
143. 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
144. Id. at 818-32.
145. Id. at 834. In a recent article, William Stuntz suggested that the right of self-
representation recognized in Faretta rests exclusively on the possibility that the accused
will be better off without a lawyer. Stuntz, supra note 3, at 795-96. He explained that in"exceptional case[s]" the accused could better represent himself, either because ap-
pointed counsel is particularly unskilled or because the defendant himself is well-versed
in courtroom procedure or would appear more sympathetic standing alone before the
jury. Id. at 796. In this view, the right to waive counsel is meant to promote precisely
the same interest as the right to counsel: the interest in protecting against an unjust
conviction. Id. at 796.
This reading of Faretta seriously understates the importance of the defendant's au-
tonomy in decision making. If the right of self-representation were designed only for
the defendant's protection, trial courts would be permitted to override the defendant's
waiver of counsel whenever the court determined that the defendant would be better off
with a lawyer. Yet Faretta allows a trial court to override a voluntary waiver of counsel
only in the rare case, in which a defendant, although competent to stand trial, is not
competent to understand the importance of the right to counsel. See 422 U.S. at
835-36. That Faretta requires the trial judge to defer to a defendant's ill-advised deci-
sion to represent himself demonstrates that Faretta is more concerned with allowing de-
fendants to make a free choice than with allowing them to make a wise choice.
146. 422 U.S. at 834 (quoting Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 350-51 (1970)
(Brennan, J., concurring)).
147. Id. at 833-34. The Court noted that freedom of choice is built into the proce-
dural protections afforded to the accused at trial; for example, an accused has the right
to decide whether to testify at trial. Id. at 834 n.45.
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"paternalistic view of the citizen's right to select his or her own lawyer,"
as reflected in the Court's failure to give adequate "weight to the in-
formed and voluntary character of the clients' waiver of their right to
conflict-free representation." 148 As Justice Stevens suggests, the Wheat
majority did not so much repudiate as deemphasize the importance of
the criminal defendant's interest in having decisions regarding his de-
fense respected.
The Court's lack of concern was reflected, in part, in its view of the
relative insignificance of the defendant's right to counsel of choice:
[W]hile the right to select and be represented by one's pre-
ferred attorney is comprehended by the Sixth Amendment,
the essential aim of the Amendment is to guarantee an effec-
tive advocate for each criminal defendant rather than to en-
sure that a defendant will inexorably be represented by the
lawyer whom he prefers.' 49
The novelty of the Court's ordering emerges particularly clearly when
one considers that historically the sixth amendment was understood to
guarantee only "the assistance of counsel of [the accused's] own selec-
tion." 150 The sixth amendment right to appointed counsel has been
recognized by the Court only in the past 50 years,' 5 ' while the sixth
amendment right to effective representation has been recognized by it
only in the past two decades. 152
The Court's lack of concern for the autonomy of the accused was
also reflected in the analysis that it adopted. The decision to subject
the right to counsel of choice to a balancing test was not clearly or-
dained by the Court's prior decisions. The Court had previously deter-
mined that a trial judge does not have to make a special
accommodation, by postponing a trial, in order to enable the defendant
to be represented by his preferred attorney, who was unavailable at an
earlier date. 153 But the Court had never before determined that, in or-
der to promote countervailing public interests, a trial judge could for-
bid a defendant from being represented by an attorney who was ready,
willing and able to try the case on the date scheduled.
Moreover, a genuine concern for the autonomy of the accused
148. 108 S. Ct. at 1704 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
149. Id. at 1697; see also Fuller v. Diesslin, 868 F.2d 604, 608 (3d Cir. 1989) (ap-
proving state's argument that, in Wheat, "the Court implies that the right to counsel of
choice is grounded in the right to effective assistance of counsel").
150. Andersen v. Treat, 172 U.S. 24, 29 (1898); see Caplin & Drysdale v. United
States, 57 U.S.L.W. 4836,4843 (U.S.June 22, 1989) (Blackmun,J., dissenting) (" '[T]he
right to counsel being conceded, a defendant should be afforded a fair opportunity to
secure counsel of his own choice.'" (quoting Powell v. Arkansas, 287 U.S. 45, 53
(1932))); Winick, Forfeiture of Attorneys' Fees Under RICO and CCE and the Right to
Counsel of Choice: The Constitutional Dilemma and How to Avoid It, 43 U. Miami L.
Rev. 765, 786-99 (1989) (tracing historical origins of right to counsel of choice).
151. SeeJohnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
152. See McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 770-71 (1970).
153. Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1 (1983).
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should have led the Court to view disqualification as a measure of last
resort. In seeking to disqualify defense counsel in Wheat, the prosecu-
tor relied on the fact that codefendant Gomez-Barajas had not yet
pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea bargain. According to the prosecutor,
there thus remained the possibility that the trial court would reject the
plea agreement, that Gomez-Barajas would stand trial, that Wheat
would be called as a government witness at the trial, and that Iredale
would be unable to conduct an effective cross-examination because of
his duty to preserve Wheat's confidences. The possibility that this
chain of events would occur could have been entirely eliminated, how-
ever, had the trial judge simply adjourned Wheat's trial until after
Gomez-Barajas's plea had been accepted. Had the plea been accepted,
the potential conflict between Wheat's interests and those of Gomez-
Barajas would have vanished. Yet the majority in Wheat thought the
defendant's autonomy of such slight importance that it failed even to
consider holding trial judges responsible for seeking procedural alter-
natives to disqualification.
Perhaps the full measure of the Court's departure in Wheat from its
past concern for the autonomy of the accused can be seen not in what
the Court said, but in what it did not say about Faretta. In Faretta, the
Court determined that a defendant is entitled to respect for one of the
most fundamental, yet most controversial, decisions relating to one's
defense-the decision to represent oneself.154 The decision to be rep-
resented by an attorney with a conflict of interest would seem to reflect
an equally fundamental choice. Thus, prior to Wheat, a number of
lower courts had concluded that proper respect for the defendant's dig-
nity and autonomy demanded that the defendant's waiver of conflict-of-
interest claims be upheld. 155 In United States v. Curcio,156 for example,
154. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 832-34 (1975).
155. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez Andino, 831 F.2d 1164, 1170 (1st Cir. 1987),
cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2018 (1988); United States v. Curcio, 694 F.2d 14, 25-26 (2d
Cir. 1982); United States v. Laura, 607 F.2d 52, 56 (3d Cir. 1979); United States v.
Garcia, 517 F.2d 272, 277 (5th Cir. 1975); cf. United States v. Cirrincione, 780 F.2d 620,
628 (7th Cir. 1985) ("[O]nly in unique circumstances can a court disqualify counsel over
a defendant's objection when the sole basis for that disqualification is a potential for a
conflict of interest of which both defendants are aware.").
In contrast to Wheat, which seems to authorize the disqualification of counsel even
where the representation will not result in an ethical violation, these lower court cases
permitted a defendant to consent to the representation even when it was likely to involve
a conflict of interest to which consent could not be given under the prevailing profes-
sional norms. See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
In criminal cases, the paternalistic concerns underlying the ethical codes' conflict
provisions would generally weigh heavily against accepting waivers of conflict-of-interest
claims, cf. supra note 19, and even more heavily against allowing self-representation.
Criminal defendants are less able than most clients to make a knowledgeable decision
about their representation, both because they tend to be among the least sophisticated
of clients and because pending criminal charges place them under unusual pressure.
Yet, in assessing the adequacy of a waiver prior to Wheat, trial judges generally did not
impose upon the defendant their own view of his best interests, either directly or indi-
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the Second Circuit opined that the decision whether to be represented
by a lawyer with a conflict of interest was analogous to the Faretta deci-
sion whether to be represented by counsel at all, which the sixth
amendment entrusts exclusively to the defendant. In the Second Cir-
cuit's view, a defendant had a comparable right to make the "strategic
and moral" decision to proceed with a lawyer who had a conflict of
interest. 157
Indeed, the argument based on Faretta might have been put even
more strongly in Curcio. At least insofar as the defendant's own inter-
ests are concerned, Faretta clearly controls cases in which the accused
seeks to waive his right to conflict-free representation: if a defendant
has the right to decide to have no lawyer, a fortiori he can choose to
have a conflicted lawyer. Although this does not address the counter-
vailing societal interests in Wheat, many of the same or equally compel-
ling interests were also present in Faretta.'58 Yet the Wheat Court did
not acknowledge the lower court decisions that relied on Faretta, and it
made virtually no mention of Faretta itself.' 59 The Court did not con-
rectly, under the guise of determining whether the defendant's waiver was knowing and
voluntary. That a valid waiver of constitutional rights may be made by even the most
unsophisticated criminal defendant facing the most serious charges is in large part a
product of respect for the dignity and autonomy of the individual accused.
156. 694 F.2d 14. This was a subsequent opinion in the case that is discussed supra
notes 132-33 and accompanying text.
157. Id. at 25. Similarly, the Third Circuit found that a defendant's qualified right
to choose his attorney derived from the broader principle, recognized in Faretta, that "a
defendant has the right to decide, within limits, the type of defense he wishes to mount."
Laura, 607 F.2d at 56. The court opined that attorneys "are not fungible," but "may
differ as to their trial strategy, their oratory style, or the importance they give to particu-
lar legal issues." The choice among different lawyers may therefore "become[] critical
to the type of defense" that will be made. Id. Moreover, "the ability of a defendant to
select his own counsel permits him to choose an individual in whom he has confidence.
With this choice, the intimacy and confidentiality which are important to an effective
attorney-client relationship can be nurtured." Id. at 57.
158. See infra notes 165-67 and accompanying text.
159. The Court referred to the Faretta decision only once, in a footnote, in order to
explain that the right to represent oneself does not encompass the right to be repre-
sented by "any advocate" one chooses, such as an individual who has not been admitted
to the bar. 108 S. Ct. at 1697 & n.3. The Court declined to elaborate on the defendant's
interest in deciding for himself whether to undertake the risks created by counsel's po-
tential conflict. Instead, while acknowledging the defendant's qualified "right to choose
[his] own counsel," the Court emphasized that the sixth amendment right to counsel
was primarily a "guarantee [of] an effective advocate." Id. at 1697.
In determining that the defendant's preferences were not of paramount impor-
tance, the Court relied in part on Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745 (1983), a case in which a
majority of the Court had devalued the dignitary principles underlying Faretta. The de-
fendant in Barnes claimed that he should have been allowed to decide which nonfrivolous
issues would be briefed and argued by appointed counsel on appeal. The dissenting
Justices agreed, based on Faretta. 463 U.S. at 755-64 (Brennan, J., dissenting). How-
ever, the majority essentially ignored the dissent's concern for the defendant's personal
autonomy. See Berger, supra note 29, at 31 (Barnes majority "sidestepped" issue of
proper allocation of decision making power between defendant and counsel).
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sider at all the dignitary interests underlying both the right of self-rep-
resentation and the qualified right to counsel of choice; and it did not
even remark on the more than superficial anomaly that a defendant
should be allowed to waive the right to an attorney altogether, but not
to waive the comparatively less important right to an attorney whose
loyalties are undivided.
Finally, the rule authorizing judges to override a defendant's
waiver departs sharply from the traditional conception of the defend-
ant's decision-making autonomy when the rule is applied to cases like
Wheat, in which counsel's potential conflict will affect only a discrete
aspect of his representation. Suppose, for example, that after Bravo
testified for the government at Wheat's trial, Wheat instructed his at-
torney not to cross-examine Bravo. Wheat may have decided that
Bravo's testimony did not strongly implicate him, or he may have de-
cided that he did not want to undermine the interests of a cocon-
spirator. In either case, under the Code of Professional Responsibility,
Wheat's attorney would be obliged to carry out Wheat's request, even if
it were contrary to the attorney's best professional judgment. 160 In ad-
dition, if the trial judge disagreed with Wheat's decision, he too would
be unable to countermand it.161 To do so would improperly interfere
with defense strategy and with the defendant's right to control his de-
fense. It is anomalous that Wheat's decision to forego cross-examining
Bravo altogether would be entitled to respect, but his decision to con-
sent to his lawyer's potential conflict would not be, when the only harm
threatened by that conflict was the possibility that the lawyer's cross-
examination of Bravo would not be quite as effective as it might other-
wise have been. 162
160. See, e.g., Foster v. Strickland, 707 F.2d 1339, 1343 (11 th Cir. 1983) (defense
counsel "had an ethical obligation to comply with his client's wishes" and not present
his preferred defense), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 993 (1984); Model Code of Professional
Responsibility EC7-8 (1981) ("In the final analysis .... the lawyer should always remem-
ber that the decision whether to forego legally available objectives or methods because
of non-legal factors is ultimately for the client and not for himself.").
161. See, e.g., United States v. Decoster, 624 F.2d 196, 229 (D.C. Cir. 1976)
(MacKinnon,J., concurring) (" 'The accused is entitled to the trial judgment of his coun-
sel, not the tactical opinions of the judge.' " (quoting Mitchell v. United States, 259 F.2d
787, 793 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 850 (1958))).
162. The Wheat Court did not entirely lose sight of the importance of the decision-
making autonomy of the criminal accused. The saving grace of the Court's decision is its
rejection of the view that any risk of conflict, however remote, would justify disqualifica-
tion. Thus, only a "serious potential for conflict" warrants disqualification. 108 S. Ct. at
1700. In drawing the line as it did, the Court implicitly acknowledged the defendant's
interest in receiving judicial respect for choice of counsel. Had the Court determined
that the sixth amendment promised no more than an effective advocate, it would have
authorized the disqualification of defense counsel when there was merely a remote pos-
sibility of a conflict, as long as there was an equally competent attorney to substitute for
the defendant's counsel of preference. Cf. In re Gopman, 531 F.2d 262, 266 (5th Cir.
1976) ("[T]he court's discretion permits 'it to nip any potential conflict of interest in the
bud .... ' " (quoting Tucker v. Shaw, 378 F.2d 304, 307 (2d Cir. 1967))).
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E. The Institutional Interests of the Judiciary
In decisions prior to Wheat, the Court gave little weight to the judi-
cial interests implicated by a defense counsel's potential conflict of in-
terest. The Court's decisions focused almost exclusively on the rights
and interests of the accused, with small regard for the interests of the
trial court or, for that matter, the government.
This is not to say that there were no relevant judicial interests in
those cases. To the contrary, the institutional interests of the judiciary
were relevant to every one of those cases. For example, in Cuyler v.
Sullivan,16 3 the judicial interest in preserving judgments of conviction
was significantly implicated. The Court was called upon to determine
whether a defendant could challenge his conviction if defense counsel's
conflict of interest was never called to the trial judge's attention. If
right-to-counsel claims are upheld in cases in which the trial judge and
prosecutor were unaware of and could not have been aware of the con-
flict, then convictions will be overturned because of a problem neither
the judge nor the prosecutor could have done anything to avoid. Yet
the Court refused to limit post-conviction challenges to cases in which
the prosecutor or the judge was remiss.1 64 It was apparently not per-
suaded that the judicial interest in preserving judgments outweighed a
defendant's interest in conflict-free representation. Similarly, in Faretta
v. California,165 the Court refused to defer to the strong societal interest
in promoting the fairness of criminal proceedings. The Faretta Court
upheld the right of self-representation despite the fact that it "cut
against the grain" of earlier decisions to the effect that "the help of a
lawyer is essential to assure the defendant a fair trial"' 166 and that "in
most criminal prosecutions defendants could better defend with coun-
sel's guidance than by their own unskilled efforts."' 67
The Wheat decision reflected a substantial shift in the Court's em-
phasis from the defendant's interests to three independent institutional
interests which, in the Court's view, justified disqualifying an attorney
who had either an actual or a substantial potential conflict. However,
163. 446 U.S. 335 (1980).
164. Id. at 344-45, 348-49. Similarly, in Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60
(1942), the trial judge appointed Glasser's attorney to represent the codefendant in or-
der to promote very real judicial interests. If the judge had appointed a separate lawyer
who was unfamiliar with the case, the judge would have had to sever the trials or delay a
joint trial in order to give the new lawyer enough time to prepare. Yet the Court gave
no indication that the interest in judicial economy was of particular importance.
165. 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
166. Id. at 832-33.
167. Id. at 834. The three dissenters believed that the societal interests involved
outweighed the interests of the defendant. See id. at 839 (Burger, CJ., dissenting) (The"goal [of achievingjustice] is ill-served, and the integrity of and public confidence in the
system are undermined, when an easy conviction is obtained due to the defendant's ill-
advised decision to waive counsel.").
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none of the three interests cited by the Court provided a strong basis
for overriding the defendant's interest in choice of counsel.
1. The Preservation ofJudgments. - The interest in preserving judg-
ments of conviction-an aspect of both the general administrative in-
terest in conserving judicial resources and the broader public interest
in the finality of judgments in criminal cases-is the interest that has
most concerned courts in conflict-of-interest cases.168 It is undoubt-
edly a legitimate and important interest; however, it is unlikely that the
disqualification of defense counsel would promote this interest where
the accused makes a knowing and voluntary waiver of conflict-of-inter-
est claims in order to be represented by the attorney of his choice.
As noted earlier, a knowing and voluntary waiver of conflict-of-in-
terest claims forecloses a defendant from attacking his conviction on
the basis of his attorney's conflict.169 The Wheat Court nevertheless in-
voked the spectre that a defendant who had waived the right to conflict-
168. The judicial interests in preserving convictions and conserving resources vary
during different stages of a criminal proceeding, and the courts' view of the seriousness
of conflicts of interest tends to vary accordingly, resulting in a triple standard in the
evaluation of potential conflicts of interest in criminal cases.
When potential conflicts are called to a trial court's attention at the outset of a
criminal case, the court's administrative interests will be strongly served by the disquali-
fication of counsel for various reasons. Disqualification may forestall future litigation
concerning counsel's potential conflict, without significantly interfering with the court's
management of its docket or requiring the duplication of judicial resources. Not sur-
prisingly, courts tend to exaggerate the significance of potential conflicts to justify the
disqualification of defense counsel. See, e.g., Wheat v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 1692,
1699 (1988); United States ex rel. Stewart, 870 F.2d 854, 857-58 (2d Cir. 1989); United
States v. Cheshire, 707 F. Supp. 235, 240-41 (M.D. La. 1989); United States v. Sanders,
688 F. Supp. 373, 373-74 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
When a defense lawyer moves on the eve of trial or mid-trial to withdraw because of
a potential conflict, the substitution of a new attorney who would need time to prepare
for trial would require the court to rearrange its docket and to repeat proceedings. In
such cases, courts tend to regard potential conflicts as less significant in order tojustify
the denial of withdrawal motions. See, e.g., United States v. Jeffers, 520 F.2d 1256,
1265 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1066 (1976); United States v. Suntar
Roofing, Inc., 709 F. Supp. 1526, 1540-42 (D. Kan. 1989). See generally Lowenthal,
supra note 8, at 42-44 (discussing timing of motions to withdraw).
Finally, a court's administrative interest is most seriously implicated when a defend-
ant challenges his conviction based on counsel's alleged conflict of interest. Courts are
least likely to take potential conflicts seriously in these cases, because doing so might
require a retrial. See, e.g., Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 783-88 (1987); Cerro v.
United States, 872 F.2d 780, 784-86 (7th Cir. 1989); Mosier v. Murphy, 790 F.2d 62,
64-66 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 988 (1986).
Note that the Wheat Court did not address the question whether a court's general
interest in preserving limited judicial resources-as distinct from its interest in preserv-
ing judgments of conviction-would justify the disqualification of counsel when defense
counsel has a serious potential for conflict. This question would be raised in a case in
which a conflict could be avoided by severing the trial of codefendants or by granting
other relief that would require the duplication of court time. See infra note 211 and
accompanying text.
169. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
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free counsel could later successfully challenge his conviction on
grounds occasioned by his attorney's conflict of interest. The Court
suggested that the defendant's waiver, while foreclosing conflict-of-in-
terest claims, might not foreclose claims based on a denial of effective
representation.170 The Court expressly declined to "pass[] judgment
on" whether a waiver foreclosed these claims as well. 17 1 However, be-
cause of the possibility that ineffective assistance claims would survive a
waiver, the Court found that trial judges can appropriately override a
defendant's waiver to assure "that their judgments [will] remain intact
on appeal."' 172
This was a wholly inadequate justification for the Court's decision:
it exaggerates the trial judge's prospect of being reversed in spite of the
defendant's knowing and voluntary waiver. Although it is not unusual
for courts upholding the disqualification of counsel to express doubt
about the effectiveness of the defendant's waiver,1 7 3 the Wheat Court
failed to find a single case in which a conviction whs actually overturned
because of attorney errors attributable to a conflict that had been know-
ingly and voluntarily waived.' 74 This is scarcely surprising. To the ex-
tent that a defense attorney's errors are attributable to the conflict that
the defendant waived, it seems obvious that the ineffective assistance
claim is simply another way of characterizing the foreclosed conflict-of-
interest claim. A waiver of conflict-free counsel would naturally be, at
the same time, a waiver of challenges to attorney errors arising out of
the conflict.' 75 There is therefore no reason to disqualify an attorney
in order to avoid such claims.
170. 108 S. Ct. at 1698.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. See, e.g., United States v. Cheshire, 707 F. Supp. 235, 239-40 (M.D. La.
1989); United States v. Sanders, 690 F. Supp. 677 (N.D. Ill. 1988); see also United States
v. Dolan, 570 F.2d 1177, 1184 (3d Cir. 1978) (disqualification serves "independent in-
terest of the trial judge to be free from future attacks over the adequacy of the waiver").
174. The Court cited several cases demonstrating the lower courts' "apparent will-
ingness... to entertain" such challenges. 108 S. Ct. at 1698.
175. Appellate courts have held a defendant's waiver of conflict-of-interest claims
to be ineffective only in cases in which the trial judge failed properly to advise the de-
fendant or adequately to question the defendant to ensure that the waiver was knowing
and voluntary. See, e.g., United States v. Iorizzo, 786 F.2d 52, 59 (2d Cir. 1986); United
States v. Unger, 700 F.2d 445,451-54 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 934 (1983); Zuck
v. Alabama, 588 F.2d 436, 440 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 833 (1979).
On the other hand, when the trial judge fully questioned the defendant and subse-
quently determined that the defendant's waiver was knowing and voluntary, courts have
rejected claims that defense counsel failed to provide adequate assistance because of a
conflict of interest. See, e.g., United States v. Roth, 860 F.2d 1382, 1387-89 (7th Cir.
1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 2099 (1989); United States v. Williams, 809 F.2d 1072,
1085 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 228, 259, 506 (1987); United States v. Akinseye,
802 F.2d 740, 745 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 916 (1987); see also Holloway
v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 483 n.5 (1978) (citing Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60,
70 (1942)). There is thus little realistic possibility of reversal on account of errors attrib-
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Assuming the Court is correct that federal law is uncertain as to the
scope of a waiver of conflict-of-interest claims, it is hard to understand
why the Court declined to resolve this uncertainty, and yet authorized
the disqualification of defense attorneys in order to protect judgments
of conviction from challenges which might be unavailing as a matter of
law. The Supreme Court, unlike other courts that rely on this ration-
ale, 176 was in a position to give a definitive answer to the open ques-
tion. The Court could have confirmed the obvious: that knowing and
voluntary waivers of conflict-of-interest claims foreclose ineffective
assistance of counsel claims based on attorney errors attributable to de-
fense counsel's conflicts of interest. Announcing this rule would have
promoted precisely the same interest that the Court purported to serve
by authorizing the disqualification of defense lawyers: the interest in
preserving judgments of conviction. However, it would have done so
in a way that preserved rather than derogated the defendant's interest
in choice of counsel.
2. Preserving the Ethical Standards of the Legal Profession. - The Wheat
Court found that, when defense counsel has a conflict of interest, the
defendant's interest in counsel of choice may be outweighed by an "in-
dependent interest in ensuring that criminal trials are conducted within
the ethical standards of the profession."' 77 This determination is ques-
tionable in three respects: First, it authorizes disqualification even
when the standards permit representation of conflicting interests. Sec-
ond, it fails to recognize that in some cases the interests promoted by
the conflict-of-interest rules are not implicated or are not particularly
compelling. Finally, it ignores the courts' authority to interpret the
conflict-of-interest rules to determine whether a lawyer's representa-
tion of potentially conflicting interests is in fact a violation.
To begin with, the Court presupposed that whenever defense
counsel has an actual conflict, the representation is unethical so that the
disqualification of counsel is justified by the interest in promoting the
ethical standards of the legal profession.' 78 To the contrary, a client
generally may consent to conflicts which will not impair the representa-
utable to defense counsel's conflict as long as the waiver proceedings are conducted
carefully.
Several courts have suggested that if the defendant's waiver of potential conflicts is
not sufficiently broad, the defendant's waiver may not foreclose all subsequent claims
based on errors attributable to an actual conflict that emerged at trial. See, e.g., United
States v. Fahey, 769 F.2d 829, 835 (Ist Cir. 1985). This concern may easily be addressed
by requiring the defendant to make a broad waiver of all claims relating to defense coun-
sel's potential or actual conflict. Cf. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834-35 n.46
(1975) (defendant's waiver of right to counsel and decision to represent himself fore-
closes later claims that he was denied effective representation).
176. See cases cited supra note 173.
177. 108 S. Ct. at 1697.
178. See id. at 1698.
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tion. 179 Wheat is an example of a case in which defense counsel's repre-
sentation of several clients with their informed consent would not
contravene the relevant standards governing conflicts of interest.180 At
best, a trial judge would be justified in overriding a defendant's waiver,
in order to promote the ethical conduct of trials, when the attorney has
an actual conflict to which consent may not be given under the prevail-
ing professional norms.
Moreover, the Wheat Court failed to consider whether the profes-
sional standards, insofar as they do proscribe the representation of con-
flicting interests, have a sufficiently compelling justification to
overcome a defendant's constitutionally protected interest in being
represented by the counsel of his choice. The Court's reference to the
"ethical standards of the profession" suggests that it considered such an
inquiry unnecessary because the professional standards embody immu-
table principles of right and wrong. Yet the professional standards are
not a moral code. They may protect interests that are not especially
compelling, or, while serving important interests, may not be closely
tailored to those interests. In considering constitutional challenges to
the judicial enforcement of professional standards, the Court has there-
fore been required to scrutinize those standards to determine whether
they serve sufficiently compelling interests to outweigh interests of con-
stitutional magnitude asserted by an individual. On occasion, the
Court has found that the professional standards do not withstand such
scrutiny. 1 8 1
The rules governing conflicts of interest might not stand up to this
scrutiny, either. It has been argued, for example, that the rules prohib-
iting the representation of interests adverse to those of a former client
generally do not serve a legitimate purpose. 18 2 The rules are especially
susceptible to attack in those cases in which the rule's underlying inter-
ests are not clearly implicated.' 8 3
179. See supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
180. See supra notes 91-95 and accompanying text.
181. See, e.g., Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 108 S. Ct. 1916, 1921-24 (1988);
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 641-44, 647-49 (1985); Bates
v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 363-72 (1977).
182. See Goldberg, supra note 77, at 259-86.
183. United States v. Cheshire, 707 F. Supp. 235 (M.D. La. 1989), is a good illustra-
tion of a case in which the district court granted the government's disqualification mo-
tion even though the justifications underlying the prevailing conflict-of-interest
standards were not strongly served. In Cheshire two defendants were charged with mak-
ing pay-offs to public housing officials in order to obtain business with the Baton Rouge
Housing Authority. Id. at 237. The district judge disqualified the first defendant's law-
yer, Marabella, because he had previously represented the government's key witness.
Id. at 240. In addition, the judge disqualified Fournet, counsel for the second defend-
ant, because she sublet office space from Marabella and was associated in practice with
him. Id. at 240-41. The district judge accepted that, even though the two lawyers'
names appeared together on a letterhead, they maintained independent practices, with
separate files, clients, bank accounts, secretaries, and office staff. Id. at 237-38. More-
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In Wheat, the Court assumed that the standards governing conflicts
of interest were of sufficient weight to overcome a criminal defendant's
constitutionally-recognized interest in choosing counsel, without con-
sidering the justifications for those standards. This is particularly
anomalous given that in civil cases, in which the client does not have a
constitutionally protected interest,18 4 courts often have regarded dis-
qualification as an inappropriate remedy for conflicts of interest which
violate ethical standards but do not taint the trial process.185 If the
interests promoted by the ethical standards are not weighty enough to
over, Fournet had never done any work on behalf of the government witness and had no
knowledge of Marabella's work on the witness's behalf. Id. at 238. Nevertheless, the
court concluded that, because the lawyers held themselves out to the public as a law
firm, Fournet's involvement in the case would be forbidden by the ABA Rule providing
that" '[w]hile lawyers are associated in a firm, none of them shall knowingly represent a
client when any one of them practicing alone would be prohibited from doing so by [the
rules governing conflicts of interest].'" Id. at 240-41 (quoting Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct Rule 1.10(a) (1983)).
The rule of imputed disqualification on which the district judge relied in Cheshire
embodies an irrebuttable presumption that confidences are shared throughout a law
firm. It is thought that if an attorney such as Marabella must be disqualified because of a
conflict of interest, then all the lawyers in his firm must also be disqualified to prevent
him from leaking confidential information that may be used against his former client.
See ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 33 (1931) ("The
relations of partners in a law firm are so close that the firm, and all the members thereof,
are barred from accepting any employment, that any one member of the firm is prohib-
ited from taking."). If, as in Cheshire, the trial court is apparently convinced that the
conflicted lawyer has not imparted and would not impart confidential information to a
second lawyer, there is no genuine need to disqualify the second lawyer. Because appli-
cation of the irrebuttable presumption has the effect of denying clients their choice of
counsel, commentators have criticized its application, and courts in civil cases have been
increasingly receptive to an argument that, because there has been and will be no shar-
ing of confidences, disqualification is unnecessary. See, e.g., Tipton v. Canadian Impe-
rial Bank of Commerce, 872 F.2d 1491, 1499 (11th Cir. 1989); Panduit Corp. v. All
States Plastic Mfg. Co., 744 F.2d 1564, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1984); General Elec. Co. v.
Industra Products, Inc., 683 F. Supp. 1254, 1258 (N.D. Ind. 1988); Note, The Second
Circuit and Attorney Disqualification-Silver Chrysler Steers in a New Direction, 44 Ford-
ham L. Rev. 130, 151-52 (1975); Developments in the Law, supra note 7, at 1319-20,
1356; Note, The Chinese Wall Defense to Law-Firm Disqualification, 128 U. Pa. L. Rev.
677, 679-80, 715 (1980).
In a criminal case, in which the client's interest in his choice of counsel is of consti-
tutional dimension, the district court should be particularly hesitant to apply the rule of
imputed disqualification unless there is reason to believe that disqualification is neces-
sary to promote the underlying purposes of the ethical rule. Cf. United States v.
Washington, 797 F.2d 1461, 1466-67 (9th Cir. 1986) (confidential information held by
one lawyer is not necessarily attributed to independent counsel retained to represent
defendant jointly, as it would be attributed to member of same law firm).
184. See, e.g., United States v. Cunningham, 672 F.2d at 1071 (justifications for
disqualifying counsel are weaker in a civil case, since the court is "not concerned with
any factor of constitutional dimension").
185. See, e.g., W.T. Grant Co. v. Haines, 531 F.2d 671, 677-78 (2d Cir. 1976). See
generally Note, The Advocate-Witness Rule, Let's Call It the Way We See It, 52 Alb. L.




justify disqualifying civil practitioners who have potential conflicts of
interest, it is hard to see why precisely the same interests should con-
clusively be presumed weighty enough to justify disqualifying criminal
defense attorneys.
Finally, the Wheat Court seemed to regard the conflict-of-interest
standards as immutable, so that a trialjudge would have only two alter-
natives when defense counsel's representation of conflicting interests
would seem to pose a problem: either disqualify defense counsel or
condone a violation of the professional standards. What the Court
overlooked is that the standards invoked in disqualification proceedings
are in fact court-made rules which can be revised or interpreted to ac-
commodate the defendant's interest in choosing his counsel. Unlike
the rules governing other professions, the rules governing attorneys
are promulgated by the judiciary. Although they are usually drafted by
the American Bar Association or by a state bar association, the profes-
sional standards are generally adopted and given effect by the courts
pursuant to their supervisory authority over attorneys who practice
before them.186 Thus, the courts themselves define the circumstances
in which the representation of conflicting interests is improper. In the
context ofjudicial proceedings, courts may exercise broad discretion to
adopt rules interstitially to resolve problems not addressed by the pro-
fessional standards,18 7 to decline to apply the professional stan-
dards, 18 8 or, most importantly, to interpret those standards.18 9 In civil
cases, for example, courts often construe the conflict-of-interest rules
narrowly to accommodate a litigant's interest in choice and continuity
of counsel. 190
Because the standards that apply to criminal defense lawyers are
adopted and interpreted by the judiciary, the courts are not faced with
an exclusive choice between disqualifying counsel or condoning unethi-
cal conduct. Courts may instead interpret the ethical rules consistently
with the criminal defendant's constitutional right to the counsel of his
choice. 191 If the Wheat Court had called for greater deference to a de-
186. See Green, Doe v. Grievance Committee: On the Interpretation of Ethical Rules,
55 Brooklyn L. Rev. 485, 530-34 (1989). This is true in California, where Wheat stood
trial. See California Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1-100 (1975) ("These rules...
shall become effective upon approval by the Supreme Court of California.").
187. See supra note 78.
188. See supra note 185 and accompanying text.
189. It is not unusual for courts to interpret ethical rules narrowly-applying them
only insofar as their underlying purposes are served-when they conflict with constitu-
tionally protected interests, such as the interest in free speech. See, e.g., Markfield v.
Association of the Bar of New York, 49 A.D.2d 516, 517, 370 N.Y.S.2d 82, 85 (App.
Div.), appeal dismissed, 37 N.Y.2d 794, 375 N.Y.S.2d 106 (1975) (disciplinary rule regu-
lating extrajudicial remarks by lawyers should not apply unless the lawyer's remarks
pose "a clear and present danger to the administration of justice").
190. See, e.g., International Electronics Corp. v. Flanzer, 527 F.2d 1288, 1293-95
(2d Cir. 1975); S & S Hotel v. 777 S.H. Corp., 69 N.Y.2d 437, 443 (1987).
191. The reinterpretation of the rules governing client perjury which followed the
1989] 1245
COLUMBIA LA W REVIEW
fendant's choice of counsel, courts subsequently could have interpreted
the conflict-of-interest rules narrowly in criminal cases, just as they now
do in civil cases, in order to accommodate that choice. 19 2 A representa-
tion that might now be thought to embody an impermissible conflict of
interest would no longer be deemed unethical. As a result, a more
stringent limit on the ability of trial judges to disqualify defense lawyers
would not necessarily have derogated the prevailing ethical rules.
3. Promoting the Fairness of Criminal Proceedings. - While the third
independent judicial interest identified in Wheat-the interest in ensur-
ing "that legal proceedings appear fair to all who observe them" 19 3-is
unquestionably a legitimate interest, it is not so clearly implicated in
conflict-of-interest cases as to justify the disqualification of counsel. To
be sure, the public acceptability of verdicts of guilty in criminal cases
depends in large part on a perception that criminal trials are fair. 19 4
Supreme Court's decision in Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157 (1986), illustrates how the
ethical rules may expand or contract depending on how courts interpret related consti-
tutional provisions. Prior to that decision, it was generally believed that a criminal de-
fense attorney was ethically barred from disclosing to the trial court that his client had
committed perjury. See, e.g., ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, For-
mal Op. 287 (1953). Some also believed that, when a defense attorney knew of his cli-
ent's intention to commit perjury but was unable to withdraw from the representation, it
was proper for the attorney to call his client as a witness to testify in narrative form. See,
e.g., Standards for CriminalJustice § 4-7.7(c) (2d ed. 1980) (recording proposed official
draft withdrawn prior to submission of charter to ABA House of Delegates). After the
Court made clear in Whiteside that a criminal defendant had no right to testify falsely and
that counsel's disclosure of perjurious testimony was not a denial of the sixth amend-
ment right to effective assistance of counsel, 475 U.S. at 173-75, the ABA Standing
Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility issued an opinion which inter-
preted the ethical rules more broadly to forbid the elicitation of a false narrative and, in
some cases, to require disclosure that the defendant's statements were false. ABA
Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 353 (1987).
192. For example, courts could simply interpret or amend the professional stan-
dards to provide that the representation of conflicting interests is permitted in a criminal
case with the informed consent of the defendants. At the very least, courts could inter-
pret the standards consistently in criminal and in civil cases, in contrast to the current
tendency to disqualify criminal defense attorneys in situations in which civil lawyers
would not be thought to have an impermissible conflict. See supra notes 83-84 and
accompanying text.
193. Wheat v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 1692, 1697 (1988).
194. The expression of this concern followed an extended explanation of the im-
portance of counsel to the fairness of criminal proceedings. 108 S. Ct. at 1696-97. In
the Court's view, representation by an attorney with a conflict of interest would under-
mine the apparent fairness of a criminal trial because of the possibility that the defend-
ant was receiving inadequate legal assistance.
In a recent article Professor Stuntz proposes that the "more persuasive explana-
tion" for the Wheat decision is that it is designed, in effect, to ensure that the proceed-
ings are fair to the prosecution. Stuntz, supra note 3, at 798-801. Professor Stuntz
explains that co-conspirators often decide as a group to refuse to cooperate with the
government's investigation and that, to promote this venture, they may retain one law-
yer to represent all the members of the conspiracy. He views this as an improper reason
for joint representation and suggests that the Wheat Court called for deference to a trial
judge's decision to disqualify defense counsel because a trial judge is best situated to
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But it is doubtful that a defendant's representation by an attorney with
a conflict seriously undermines the appearance of fairness when the de-
fendant has not only consented to the conflict but also insisted on the
attorney's representation.
The public's perception of whether or not a proceeding is fair does
not necessarily turn exclusively on whether, in the abstract, the trial
procedures are likely to result in a reliable outcome. A proceeding is
just as likely to be deemed fair if the defendant gets the process that he
insists on, even if that process is generally not considered to be in the
best interests of a criminal accused.1 95 Moreover, refusing to allow the
defendant to choose his attorney because of a defect which may strike
many as technical may be perceived by the public as unfair. 19 6
determine whether the defendants' motive is to obstruct the prosecution. Id. at
799-800.
There are several problems with this reading of Wheat. First, there is nothing in the
case to suggest that by retaining attorney Iredale the codefendants sought to promote
an agreement not to cooperate with the government. To the contrary, the facts of Wheat
strongly suggest that Wheat's intent was simply to obtain the services of a skilled attor-
ney. For example, Wheat did not retain Iredale until after Iredale's other two clients
had worked out plea agreements with the government. 108 S. Ct. at 1694-95. At that
point, it was too late for Bravo and Gomez-Barajas to benefit from an agreement with
Wheat to obstruct the prosecution. The likelihood of such an agreement, as well as the
need for one, was further undercut by the fact that Wheat and Bravo had never even
heard of each other before they were arrested. See 108 S. Ct. at 1703 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
Second, there is nothing in the case to suggest that the district judge believed that by
retaining Iredale, Wheat was seeking to facilitate an agreement to obstruct the prosecu-
tion. As quoted by the Wheat Court, the trial judge simply found that there was "an
irreconcilable conflict of interest" which thejudge did not think could be waived. 108 S.
Ct. at 1696.
Third, there is nothing in the Wheat decision to suggest that the Court itself be-
lieved either that Iredale's clients were seeking to obstruct the prosecution or that it
considered it appropriate to disqualify an attorney in order to protect against this possi-
bility.
Finally, it is probably not appropriate for a court to disqualify an attorney simply to
facilitate the prosecution's strategy of "divide and conquer." A decision by codefend-
ants to stand trial collectively rather than to cooperate with the government, while mak-
ing the investigation or prosecution of a criminal conspiracy more difficult, is not a crime
and might reasonably be considered a legitimate defense. See Moore, Disqualification
of an Attorney Representing Multiple Witnesses Before a Grand Jury: Legal Ethics and
the Stonewall Defense, 27 UCLA L. Rev. 1, 17-20, 52-79 (1979). But see Geer, supra
note 5, at 156; Lowenthal, supra note 7, at 966-67. There is therefore no reason why a
trial court should attempt to undermine the defendants' decision by disqualifying coun-
sel, particularly since the disqualification of counsel would not necessarily be effective:
codefendants can present a united front even with separate counsel.
195. For example, in North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 38-39 (1970), the
Court approved a procedure under which a criminal defendant, while asserting his inno-
cence, could be convicted based on his entry of a plea of guilty together with the prose-
cution's uncontested proffer of evidence in support of the allegations.
196. See United States v. Washington, 797 F.2d 1461, 1466 (9th Cir. 1986). The
spectre of public disillusionment with the judiciary has also concerned courts in civil
cases. See, e.g., Woods v. Covington County Bank, 537 F.2d 804, 813 (5th Cir. 1976);
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Thejudiciary's concern for the appearance of fairness rings partic-
ularly hollow when one contrasts the holding in Wheat with the holding
in Cuyler v. Sullivan.19 7 Suppose, for example, that a defendant's attor-
ney had an actual conflict of interest of which the defendant was una-
ware; thus, the defendant did not consent to the conflicted
representation. Notwithstanding the apparent unfairness of the pro-
ceeding, that defendant would not be entitled to a new trial if he could
not also show that the conflict "adversely affected his lawyer's perform-
ance."19 8 Unfair or not, the conviction would be upheld out of defer-
ence to interests, such as the interest in preserving judgments, that
outweigh the interest in preserving the appearance that criminal trials
are fair.199 In contrast, although the defendant strongly insisted upon
a lawyer who had a potential conflict after receiving advice from an in-
dependent attorney and over the prosecutor's objection, the appear-
ance of fairness was deemed compelling enough in Wheat to warrant
overriding the defendant's waiver. Obviously, the appearance of un-
fairness is much greater in the first case than in the second. If nothing
else, these results show that, in the pantheon ofjudicially protected in-
terests, the institutional interest in preserving judgments overshadows
the interest in preserving the appearance of fair judicial proceedings,
while the defendant's interest in his choice of counsel, although recog-
nized by the sixth amendment, is the least significant of all.
III. A PROPOSED FRAMEWORK FOR DECIDING DISQUALIFICATION
MOTIONS
A. The Trial Judge's Responsibility After Wheat
The Wheat Court established the trial judge's broad discretion to
issue rulings in an area of enormous importance to criminal defendants
and to criminal trials in general, yet gave virtually no guidance to trial
Trinity Ambulance Serv., Inc. v. G & L Ambulance Servs., Inc., 578 F. Supp. 1280,
1282-83 & n.6 (D. Conn. 1984).
The apparent unfairness of disqualifying defense counsel is exacerbated in most
cases by the fact that the court's ruling is made at the request of the prosecution, which
may obtain a tactical benefit from disqualifying defense counsel. See Green, supra note
34, at 337.
197. 446 U.S. 335 (1980).
198. Id. at 350.
199. The administrative interest in conserving judicial and prosecutorial resources
may take precedence over the institutional interest in promoting ethical conduct. In
United States v. Hastings, 660 F.2d 301, 303 (7th Cir. 1981), rev'd, 461 U.S. 499 (1983),
the Seventh Circuit reversed the defendant's conviction because the prosecutor's closing
argument violated the defendant's fifth amendment rights by indirectly referring to the
defendant's failure to take the stand. The Court of Appeals action was apparently in-
tended to discipline the prosecutor for ignoring frequent judicial warnings against com-
menting on a defendant's failure to rebut the government's case. The Supreme Court
concluded, however, that, because the prosecutor's misconduct was harmless, it was im-




judges concerning the exercise of that discretion. The Court noted
simply that, under the facts of Wheat, the trial judge could have opted to
disqualify defense attorney Iredale or not "with equal justification. ' 20 0
As a consequence, Wheat leaves open an important question: How
should a court decide whether to disqualify a defense lawyer who is
likely to have a conflict of interest?
It can be expected that Wheat will have a centrifugal effect, causing
many trial judges to exercise their discretion at the margins. At one
extreme, a significant number ofjudges will almost invariably refuse to
disqualify an attorney when the defendant makes a valid waiver. At the
other extreme, many trial judges will almost automatically disqualify an
attorney who has a serious potential for conflict, notwithstanding the
defendant's proffered waiver. While inconsistent with the traditional
notion that a proper exercise ofjudicial discretion entails the weighing
of all relevant considerations, 20 1 each of these approaches has both an
administrative and a philosophical appeal.
Under the first approach, the crucial question is whether the de-
fendant has made a knowing and voluntary waiver of potential conflict-
of-interest claims. If the waiver is valid, the trial judge will respect the
defendant's choice of counsel.20 2 This approach narrows the scope of
200. 108 S. Ct. at 1700. The Court could have provided greater guidance to fed-
eral if not state courts pursuant to its supervisory authority. See, e.g., McNabb v. United
States, 318 U.S. 332, 340-41 (1943); see generally Beale, Reconsidering Supervisory
Power in Criminal Cases: Constitutional and Statutory Limits on the Authority of the
Federal Courts, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 1433, 1435-55 (1984) (describing Supreme Court's
exercise of supervisory power over federal courts in wide variety of situations in order to
guide and control administration of criminal justice).
201. See, e.g., Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 257 (1981).
202. See, e.g., United States v. Alamo, 872 F.2d 202, 204 (7th Cir. 1989). The
defendants in Alamo argued on appeal that the district judge erred in allowing them to'
be represented by an attorney with a potential conflict of interest. Id. at 204-05. They
further contended that their waivers were not knowing and voluntary, id. at 205, and
that the district judge "wrongly believed.., that she had to accede to the wishes of the
defendant without the exercise of any discretion on her part," id. at 206.
The Court of Appeals appeared to accept the defendant's novel legal premise: that
a defendant may be entitled to a new trial when a district judge abuses the discretion
recognized in Wheat by granting a defendant's request to waive potential conflicts in or-
der to be represented by counsel of choice. Id. However, the court was unconvinced
that the district judge had in fact refused to exercise, or had abused, her discretion. Id.
at 206-07.
A trial judge ruling on a disqualification motion may thus face the prospect of being"whipsawed" in a new way. A defendant who knowingly and voluntarily waives conflict-
of-interest claims may subsequently challenge the district court's ruling whether it
grants or denies the government's motion. This makes little sense. A defendant whose
waiver is valid has no constitutional right to have counsel disqualified over his own ob-
jection. While the government might reasonably argue that its disqualification motion
should not be rejected summarily, and that the trial judge must engage in a genuine
exercise of discretion before accepting the defendant's waiver, the accused should not
have the right to raise this claim.
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the court's inquiry by eliminating the need to determine the likelihood
that defense counsel will in fact have a conflict of interest.
In addition to having the advantage of administrative ease, defer-
ence to a defendant's waiver appeals to the dwindling number ofjudges
who believe that the principal interests at stake when a defense attorney
has a real or potential conflict of interest are those of the defendant,
not the judiciary. The defendant has an interest in receiving the effec-
tive assistance of counsel, in receiving the assistance of his attorney of
choice, and in deciding for himself whether to undertake the risks at-
tendant to counsel's potential conflict. These interests are obviously
undermined by the defense counsel's disqualification, which may de-
prive the defendant of the possible strategic advantages of being repre-
sented by a particular attorney and may derogate his interest in
deciding for himself whether to continue with an attorney who may
have a conflict or to seek different representation. Courts that consider
the defendant's interests to be paramount would therefore hesitate to
intrude on the defendant's decision to consent to a conflict.
To a greater extent, however, trial judges can be expected to rule
at the outer limit of their discretion by disqualifying virtually all lawyers
who have a serious potential for conflict. This approach also has some
administrative appeal. It enables a court, while purporting to be exer-
cising its discretion, to avoid serious consideration of such matters as
the likely effect of the conflict on counsel's representation and the rela-
tive importance of the particular defense attorney to the particular de-
fendant. In contrast to a more nuanced analysis, the trial judge
adopting this approach could engage in a comparatively limited inquiry
before deciding whether to disqualify defense counsel.
The primary appeal of this approach, however, is philosophical
rather than administrative. For many judges, the institutional interests
in rendering just verdicts and in preserving public confidence in the
integrity of the legal system are more important than the interests of
the defendant. To be sure, these institutional interests are no less ab-
stract than those of the accused. They reflect little more than a desire
to receive the public's respect for the manner in which trials are con-
ducted. From a disinterested perspective, it is hard to see why thejudi-
ciary's desire to receive respect from the public is any more important
than the defendant's desire to receive the court's respect for his right to
make lawful decisions regarding the conduct of his representation.
Nevertheless, although they have no personal stake in the outcome of
the case, trial judges will understandably identify more closely with the
institutional interests of the judiciary than with the defendant's inter-
ests. Moreover, many trial judges will simply be offended by defense
lawyers who seek to represent potentially conflicting interests, because
they will perceive these lawyers to be mercenary or unethical.
Trial courts may also be encouraged to adopt this approach by a
misreading of Wheat. These courts will view Wheat as the paradigm of a
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disqualification ruling, rather than as an example of a ruling that is at
the very limit of the trial judge's discretion, if not, as four Justices rea-
sonably believed, beyond the pale. Thus, some trial courts will misuse
Wheat as a model, reasoning that if disqualification was warranted in
Wheat, a fortiori disqualification is warranted under the facts before
them.20 3
Although the federal courts of appeals may simply reinforce the
broad discretion accorded by Wheat,20 4 they may instead establish stan-
dards for ruling on disqualification motions, just as they have set stan-
dards for assessing waivers of conflicts. 20 5 In the absence of guidance
from appellate courts, trial judges generally can be expected to take an
expansive view of their role when defense counsel has a potential con-
flict of interest.20 6
B. A Proposed Framework for the Trial Court's Exercise of Discretion
Courts in criminal cases should respond to disqualification mo-
tions with a nuanced view of the adversary process-a view which gives
203. See, e.g., United States v. Sanders, 690 F. Supp. 677, 679 n.1 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
204. A trial judge's decision to disqualify defense counsel at trial will be accorded
extraordinary deference by a reviewing court for four reasons. First, an appellate court
must accept the underlying factual determinations on which the trial judge's decision is
premised, since the trial judge is in the best position to ascertain the defendant's ability
to understand the risks created by a potential conflict, to perceive improper influences
that may affect the defendant's decision, and to determine other relevant facts. See
Wheat, 108 S. Ct. at 1704 n.* (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Second, a reviewing court must give considerable deference to a trial judge's con-
clusion, based on the underlying facts, that defense counsel is likely to have a conflict of
interest at trial. Precisely because this determination is highly speculative, a court of
appeals will be unlikely to set aside a district judge's determination. Cf. Simkin v.
United States, 715 F.2d 34, 38 (2d Cir. 1983) (given highly speculative nature of deter-
mination of continued coercive effect of civil contempt sanction, trial judge has "virtu-
ally unreviewable discretion" in this area).
Third, the determination of whether the disqualification is necessary in order to
avert a likely conflict will be relegated, under the Wheat decision, "primarily to the in-
formed judgment of the trial court," 108 S. Ct. at 1700, and overturned only when it is
found that the trial court "exceeded the broad latitude which must be accorded it." Id.
at 1699.
Finally, a defendant can obtain review of a disqualification order only after convic-
tion. See Flanagan v. United States, 465 U.S. 259, 263 (1984). Appellate courts may be
extremely reluctant to reverse a conviction in a case in which a defendant received a fair
trial with the representation of a competent attorney, since the trial court's refusal to
honor defendant's preference for another lawyer probably will not have affected the
outcome of the trial. But see, e.g., Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424, 443
(1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[I]n a criminal case an erroneous order disqualifying
the lawyer chosen by the defendant should result in a virtually automatic reversal .... ).
A court might be less reluctant to reverse an order disqualifying defense counsel from
representing a witness in the grand jury. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 859
F.2d 1021, 1024 (1st Cir. 1988).
205. See supra notes 132-133 and accompanying text.
206. See The Supreme Court, 1987 Term, supra note 3, at 184.
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weight to a variety of interrelated considerations, including the limited
reach of the prevailing ethical standards; the likelihood that, in a given
case, an attorney will abide by those standards; the extent to which a
judicial inquiry may undermine a defendant's relationship with counsel;
and the relative significance of the countervailing interests of the de-
fendant and of thejudiciary. In light of these considerations, a decision
whether to disqualify counsel is necessarily a matter of some
complexity.
This Article proposes three general guidelines for ruling on dis-
qualification motions. First, courts should not undertake unnecessary
or unduly intrusive inquiries into defense counsel's potential conflict.
In determining the likelihood and dimensions of a potential conflict,
courts should give weight to defense counsel's own assessment. Sec-
ond, courts should seek procedural alternatives to disqualification. Fi-
nally, when the trial court concludes that a conflict is likely to occur, it
should decide whether to disqualify defense counsel based on an ad
hoc balancing of the countervailing interests of the accused and the
judiciary.
1. Inquiries into Potential Conflicts. - At the threshold, a court should
recognize that any inquiry into counsel's potential conflict may damage
the defendant's relationship with his present or future attorney. 207 For
this reason, a trial judge should be circumspect about inquiring into
potential conflicts in cases in which the possibility of a conflict appears
remote. To the extent that judicial inquiries must be undertaken, they
should be conducted in a manner that, as far as possible, reduces any
injury to the defendant and to his relationship with counsel. The trial
court must walk a fine line, however, since it must probe deeply enough
to make an informed evaluation of the seriousness of defense counsel's
potential conflict. At the very least, the court should make clear that its
inquiry is not a reflection on defense counsel, his integrity, or his abil-
ity. It should also press the prosecution for disclosures necessary to its
evaluation.208 Insofar as factual and strategic disclosures are elicited
from the defense, they should be received ex parte.
In determining whether defense counsel is likely to have a conflict,
the trial judge should generally give some deference to defense coun-
sel's own assessment. Defense counsel is almost invariably better situ-
ated than a trial judge to predict whether a conflict of interest will arise
at trial.209 When it is clear that defense counsel has made such a pre-
207. See supra notes 138-141 and accompanying text.
208. For example, when the government plans to call defense counsel's former cli-
ent as a witness, the government should generally be required to disclose the substance
of the witness's testimony and make early production of impeachment material to enable
the trial court to assess both the extent to which defense counsel's cross-examination
will be impaired and the extent to which a failure to cross-examine vigorously will ham-
per the defense. See Green, supra note 34, at 355.
209. Insofar as the trial judge is able fairly to elicit additional facts that are not
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diction, based on a full consideration of the information available to
him, the court should hesitate to second-guess counsel. This is espe-
cially true where the assessment is made by an independent attorney, as
opposed to one who has a pecuniary interest in being retained.
2. Procedural Alternatives. - In light of the importance of the de-
fendant's interest in counsel of choice, the "disqualification of defense
counsel should be a measure of last resort. ' 210 Thus, ajudge who finds
that defense counsel is likely to have a conflict at trial should begin by
exploring procedural alternatives to disqualification. These include not
only alternative means of eliminating or reducing the risk that defense
counsel will have a conflict of interest, but also means of reducing the
threat to legitimate judicial interests. The decision whether to disqual-
ify counsel should be made only if there is still a serious potential con-
flict even after reasonable procedural alternatives have been considered
and employed.
A trial judge may have a variety of alternatives to disqualification.
For example, the seriousness of a potential conflict when defense coun-
sel represents joint defendants may be reduced by severing their
trial. 211 Similarly, where defense counsel has a potential conflict be-
cause of the possible need for his testimony at trial, the trial judge may
make a pretrial determination concerning the admissibility of the testi-
mony. If the testimony would be admissible, the trial judge could de-
termine whether the use of stipulations would obviate the need for
defense counsel's testimony.212
In an opinion for the Seventh Circuit in United States v. Jeffers,213
then-Circuit Judge John Paul Stevens endorsed other procedural op-
tions that "would have provided adequate protection to the interests at
stake."' 214 In Jeffers, defense counsel sought to withdraw from repre-
senting a defendant when, in the middle of trial, the government indi-
cated that it would call a witness who had previously been represented
within defense counsel's possession, such as information known only to the prosecution,
the judge should do so. See supra note 111.
210. United States v. Diozzi, 807 F.2d 10, 12 (1st Cir. 1986); accord, In re Grand
Jury Proceedings, 859 F.2d 1021, 1026 (1st Cir. 1988). See generally Strossen, The
Fourth Amendment in the Balance: Accurately Setting the Scales Through the Least
Intrusive Alternative Analysis, 63 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1173, 1208-12 (1988) (overview of
constitutional cases in which the Supreme Court has adopted a "least intrusive alterna-
tive" analysis).
211. The Supreme Court has recognized that when codefendants are jointly repre-
sented by a single attorney, separate trials will reduce the risk of a conflict of interest.
See Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 347 (1980).
212. See, e.g., United States v. Diozzi, 807 F.2d 10, 13 (1st Cir. 1986); United
States v. Cortellesso, 663 F.2d 361, 363-64 (1st Cir. 1981); see also Green, supra note
34, at 356 (prosecutors have ethical obligation to enter into stipulations that would avert
need to disqualify defense counsel except where legitimate government interests would
be compromised).
213. 520 F.2d 1256 (7th Cir. 1975).
214. Id. at 1265.
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by defense counsel's law firm. The trial judge rejected defense coun-
sel's assertion that, because his law firm had learned confidential infor-
mation in the course of representing the witness, defense counsel had a
conflict of interest which necessarily precluded the possibility of an ef-
fective cross-examination. As an alternative to permitting counsel's
withdrawal, the trial judge gave defense counsel an opportunity to
make in camera disclosure to the court of any confidential information
that had been received from the government witness. The court could
then determine whether the information would ordinarily be used for
cross-examination; if the information was not useful for cross-examina-
tion, then defense counsel's possession of the information probably
would not limit counsel's ability to cross-examine the witness. In addi-
tion, to the extent that information in defense counsel's possession
might be useful for cross-examination, the court could determine
whether that information was in fact confidential and whether any claim
of confidentiality had been waived. The court could also consult the
witness to determine whether he would now waive any privilege with
respect to the information. If the court determined that the informa-
tion was not in fact confidential or that confidentiality was waived, then
the defense attorney could cross-examine the witness without having to
hold back in order to preserve the witness's confidences. 215
A trial judge might also be able to minimize the extent to which the
judiciary would lose the public's respect in the event that an actual con-
flict did materialize at trial. Among other things, if the judge decided
to accept the defendant's waiver, the judge could write an opinion ex-
plaining his decision. A decision which explained the importance of
allowing the defendant his choice of counsel might in fact promote
public respect for the judiciary, even if, as anticipated at the outset,
defense counsel did ultimately have a conflict of interest. Moreover, to
the extent that counsel's conduct of the trial did turn out to violate
prevailing professional norms, the court would have the option of re-
ferring counsel to an appropriate disciplinary body as an alternative,
and perhaps more effective, means of vindicating the public interest in
ensuring that ethical standards are maintained. 216
215. TheJeffers court did not share the concern of other courts that defense coun-
sel's proffer "would require the very disclosure [of confidences that] the [ethical] rule is
intended to protect against," Atasi Corp. v. Seagate Technology, 847 F.2d 826, 830
(Fed. Cir. 1988), and that counsel's receipt of confidential communications from his
former client should therefore be presumed, see, e.g., United States v. Provenzano, 620
F.2d 985, 1005 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 899 (1980).
216. See Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433, 443-44, 446 (2d Cir. 1980) (en
banc), vacated on other grounds, 449 U.S. 1106 (1981); Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 590
F.2d 1241, 1248 (2d Cir. 1979) (Mansfield,J., concurring); W.T. Grant Co. v. Haines,
531 F.2d 671, 677 (2d Cir. 1976). Districtjudges can also conduct disciplinary proceed-
ings to deal with possible attorney misconduct. See, e.g., United States v. Cooper, 872
F.2d 1, 2 (lst Cir. 1989).
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3. Balancing Countervailing Interests. - A trial judge should not auto-
matically disqualify defense counsel even if, after giving appropriate
weight to defense counsel's representations, the judge remains con-
vinced that defense counsel has a serious and irreducible potential for
conflict.217 In ruling on a disqualification motion, the court should
fairly take into account the legitimate competing interests of the judici-
ary ag an institution and of the defendant. This requires a judgment as
to who should bear the risk that the court erred in predicting the likeli-
hood that an actual conflict would occur. Deciding on whom to place
the risk of error should depend in turn on (a) an assessment of the
relative importance of the defendant's interest in being defended by
the counsel of his choice and the judiciary's institutional interests, and
(b) an assessment of the extent to which these interests would be im-
paired if counsel were or were not disqualified.
Although it would be difficult to make these judgments with math-
ematical rigor or precision, administrative difficulty does not warrant
the rejection of such an approach in favor of one extreme or the other.
Courts have traditionally engaged in a balancing of factors that are not
easily quantifiable. A trial court should be sensitive to the manner in
which the countervailing interests of the defendant and the judiciary
are implicated in the particular case before it. When the defendant's
interest in preserving his choice of counsel is compelling, 218 the likeli-
hood that the conflict will seriously affect the quality of defense coun-
sel's representation is small, 219 or the institutional interests of the
judiciary are threatened to a less serious extent than in the usual
case,220 the trial judge should be willing to require the judiciary, rather
than the individual defendant, to bear the risk that an actual conflict
will emerge.
The extent of the defendant's interest in preserving his choice of
counsel may vary from case to case. In Wheat, for example, the defend-
ant's interest in retaining Iredale was comparatively slight. Wheat did
not have a long-term relationship with Iredale; the trial judge's unwill-
ingness to allow the representation would not cost Wheat any addi-
tional money or delay the trial; Wheat would still be able to retain other
counsel. In other cases, however, disqualification of defense counsel
may result in the loss of an attorney who has a unique familiarity with
the facts of the case or with whom the defendant had developed a long-
term relationship of trust. 22 1 It might be difficult to duplicate this rela-
217. Even if the trial judge concludes that defense counsel does not have a serious
potential for conflict, the judge would still be well advised to require the defendant to
waive potential conflict-of-interest claims.
218. See, e.g., United States v. Renda, 669 F. Supp. 1544, 1549 (D. Kan. 1987).
219. See, e.g., United States v. Friedman, 854 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied,
109 S. Ct. 1637 (1989), discussed in Green, supra note 34, at 364 n.146.
220. See, e.g., United States v. Washington, 797 F.2d 1461, 1466 (9th Cir. 1986).
221. See, e.g., United States v. Cunningham, 672 F.2d 1064, 1070-71 (2d Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 951 (1984).
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tionship with a new, attorney in the short time left before trial.2 22
The defendant's interest in retaining his chosen counsel may be
compelling for a variety of other reasons as well. For example, the de-
fendant might have to expend a considerable amount of money to re-
tain a new lawyer who would have to carry out extensive pretrial
preparation which had already been done by the original defense law-
yer. Or, the defendant might have to suffer a substantial delay bf the
trial while a new attorney prepared for trial. Or, the effect of disqualifi-
cation might be to deprive the defendant of any choice of counsel at all.
For example, in a case like Wood v. Georgia,223 a defendant may be able
to retain an attorney only if the attorney is paid by the defendant's em-
ployer; the disqualification of privately retained counsel will mean that
the defendant must proceed with appointed counsel. 224 In cases in
which the defendant's interests are particularly weighty, it is less appro-
priate to require the defendant to bear the risk that the trial judge is
incorrect in predicting that an actual conflict will emerge at trial.
The strength of the judicial interests may also vary from case to
case. For example, the justifications for disqualification will be more
compelling when codefendants with apparently divergent interests seek
to share an attorney at a joint trial. Generally, in such a case the repre-
sentation will violate the professional standards governing conflicts of
interest and, more importantly, raise doubts about the defense coun-
sel's ability to provide competent representation, thus calling into
question the fairness of the trial. The interest in promoting the appar-
ent fairness of criminal proceedings may also be more compelling in a
case in which the defendant's waiver, although constitutionally valid,
appears nevertheless to be a product of extrinsic pressure or of the de-
fendant's limited understanding of the dangers posed by counsel's po-
tential conflict. Although the public will generally perceive a trial to be
fair when the defendant's choice of counsel is upheld because the de-
fendant will be receiving the process that he seeks, 225 this is less likely
to be true when the defendant is likely to have been influenced by more
powerful codefendants to retain a particular attorney. 226 Similarly, the
public perception of fairness will suffer when the defendant seems too
unsophisticated to grasp fully the significance of counsel's potential
conflict or, as in cases involving multiple representation, when the
222. See, e.g., Renda, 669 F. Supp. at 1549.
223. 450 U.S. 261 (1981), discussed supra note 109.
224. Cf. Winick, supra note 150, at 810-11 (when trial court's ruling deprives de-
fendant of opportunity to retain any private counsel, ruling should be scrutinized more
strictly).
225. See supra notes 195-196 and accompanying text.
226. Cf. United States v. Aiello, 814 F.2d 109, 114 & n.2 (2d Cir. 1987) (reversing
trial court's denial of habeas relief and requiring further inquiry into appellant's claims
of ineffective counsel); United States v. Padilla-Martinez, 762 F.2d 942, 949 (11 th Cir.)
(affirming disqualification where attorney probably retained in interest of employer
rather than defendants), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 952 (1985).
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scope and impact of the potential conflict are difficult for anyone to
predict.
In a given case, the judicial interests may be especially weak. Sup-
pose that defense counsel's potential conflict is one to which the pre-
vailing ethical standards allow a defendant to give consent. 227 The
judicial interest in preserving the ethical standards of the legal profes-
sion would not be undermined by upholding the defendant's choice of
counsel. Similarly, the judicial interest in ensuring the fairness of crim-
inal proceedings is not strongly implicated if counsel's potential con-
flict, although forbidden by the prevailing ethical norms, is unlikely to
affect the outcome of the defendant's trial.2 28
C. Applying the Proposed Analysis
One recent case that might have been resolved differently under
the analysis proposed above is United States v. Sanders,229 in which a fed-
eral district judge, relying heavily on Wheat, filed two published opin-
ions granting the.government's disqualification motion.
1. The District Court's First Ruling. - Sanders was charged with con-
spiracy, wire fraud, and false representation in violation of the Com-
modity Exchange Act. Lassar, one of Sanders's defense attorneys, had
previously represented a charged coconspirator and codefendant,
Dewey, during the grand jury investigation leading up to indictment.
The government moved to disqualify Lassar, alleging that Dewey took
flight after receiving notice of the indictment. The government stated
that, in the event Dewey went to trial, it would call Lassar to testify
regarding Dewey's receipt of notice of the indictment and his subse-
quent flight. This would create a conflict for Lassar, who could not
227. Wheat is such a case. See supra notes 88-95 and accompanying text.
228. For example, in United States v. Micke, 859 F.2d 473 (7th Cir. 1988), the de-
fendant was charged with assisting two other individuals in the preparation of fraudulent
tax returns. He retained as cocounsel an attorney named Gratz who had previously rep-
resented two government witnesses and who, according to the government, was himself
a potential rebuttal witness. Upon agreement of the government, the trial judge permit-
ted Gratz to sit at counsel table and lend assistance to trial counsel as long as Gratz did
not question witnesses. Id. at 480. Following the completion of the government's direct
case, the defendant decided to take the stand in his own defense. He sought the court's
permission for Gratz to conduct the direct examination. The government objected, as-
serting that the expansion of Gratz's involvement at trial would violate the ethical rules.
The trial judge agreed and forbade Gratz from questioning the defendant. Id.
Dissenting from the Seventh Circuit's decision to affirm Micke's conviction, Judge
Fairchild pointed out that it was unlikely that Gratz would have been called to testify and
that, even if he was, his testimony would relate solely to uncontested matters. Id. at
482-83 (Fairchild,J., dissenting). Under such circumstances, any violation of the ethical
rules would have been purely technical, at worst, and would not have affected either
Micke's interest in a fair trial or any governmental interests.
229. 688 F. Supp. 373 (N.D. Ill.), motion for reconsideration denied, 690 F. Supp.
677 (N.D. Ill. 1988). Another good example is United States v. Micke, 859 F.2d 473 (7th
Cir. 1988), discussed supra note 228.
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properly serve as both witness and advocate at the joint trial. In addi-
tion, the government said there was a possibility that, rather than stand
trial, Dewey would plead guilty and agree to testify against Sanders. If
that occurred, according to the government, Lassar might have a con-
flict between his duty to cross-examine Dewey vigorously and his duty
to preserve Dewey's confidences. The district judge determined that,
in the language of Wheat, there was "a serious potential for conflict"
that warranted Lassar's disqualification. 2" 0
Under the approach proposed in this Article, however, the district
judge would not have concluded so quickly that there was a serious
potential for conflict arising out of the possibility that Lassar, Sanders's
defense lawyer, would be called as a government witness to testify
against Dewey, a codefendant. The trial judge should first have con-
ducted an inquiry to ascertain whether there was an alternative to dis-
qualification that would enable Sanders to preserve his choice of
counsel while allowing the government access to relevant evidence.
The defense itself proposed one alternative. The defense told the trial
judge that Dewey would probably stipulate to the information known to
Lassar and thereby obviate the need for Lassar's testimony. 23' Instead
of rejecting the possibility of a stipulation as "speculative," 2 32 the court
should have pursued this possibility by eliciting from the government
precisely what facts it expected Lassar's testimony to establish and then
asking Dewey and his attorney whether they were willing to stipulate to
those facts.233
As another alternative, the district judge should have considered
the possibility of severing the trial of Dewey and Sanders in order to
enable Lassar to testify at one trial while acting as an advocate at the
other.23 4 Had it considered this option, the trial judge might well have
found that the interest in judicial economy, which would be served by a
single trial, would be outweighed by Sanders's interest in being repre-
sented by the counsel of his choice.23 5
Even if it found that there was no adequate alternative, the trial
judge should not immediately have disqualified Lassar. The judge next
should have considered whether Lassar's involvement as both advocate
for Sanders and witness against Dewey at a joint trial of the codefend-
ants would be an ethical violation, as well as the extent to which the
dual role would affect the fairness of the criminal proceedings. It is not
at all clear, for example, that under the Model Code of Professional
Responsibility, which applied in this jurisdiction, Lasser's dual role
would constitute an ethical violation. Disciplinary Rule 5-102 requires
230. Sanders, 688 F. Supp. at 374.
231. Id. at 373 n.l.
232. Id.
233. See supra note 212 and accompanying text.
234. See supra note 211 and accompanying text.
235. See supra note 171.
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an attorney to withdraw from the representation when it becomes obvi-
ous either that he ought to testify on behalf of his own client or that he
will be called to give testimony on behalf of another party that "is or
may be prejudicial to his client." 23 6 Nothing in the facts before the
district court suggested that Lassar's testimony about Dewey's flight
might have been prejudicial to his present client, Sanders.2 37 Thus,
even if Lassar's dual role could have been characterized as a "conflict of
interest," the institutional interests identified in Wheat would not have
been implicated to a significant extent. Lassar did not have a serious
potential conflict of interest that would have violated the prevailing
norms of ethical conduct. Nor would it necessarily have jeopardized
the fairness of the proceedings.2 38
The trial judge's decision to disqualify Lassar was also based in
part on the possibility that, if Dewey decided to cooperate with the gov-
ernment, Lassar would be forced to cross-examine a former client. The
trial judge had an available alternative to disqualification, however. He
could simply have reserved judgment on the disqualification motion.
At the point when the court issued its decision, the potential conflict
arising out of Lassar's need to cross-examine his former client was con-
tingent on an event which might never have occured-namely, Dewey's
decision to enter into a plea bargain rather than to stand trial. There
was little need for the court to anticipate that contingency and to dis-
236. Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 5-102 (1981).
237. The district judge found that "Lassar's potential testimony 'may be' prejudi-
cial to Sanders" because "[t]he flight of one coconspirator 'may be' incriminating as to
all conspirators," but did not seek a proffer from the government to permit a pretrial
determination under the facts before it whether evidence of Dewey's alleged flight
would be probative of Sanders's guilt. Sanders, 688 F. Supp. at 373. This was a flimsy
ground for disqualification since, except in the most unusual circumstances, evidence of
one defendant's flight, even if admissible to show consciousness of guilt on the part of
the defendant who fled, could not be used to show consciousness of guilt on the part of
others who did not assist in the flight. Indeed, evidence offered to show flight is often
not even admissible against the defendant who allegedly fled to avoid prosecution, since
the defendant's conduct may be insolubly ambiguous or may not be closely enough con-
nected to the crime charged. See, e.g., United States v. Beahm, 664 F.2d 414, 419-20
(4th Cir. 1981). See generally Note, Rule 403 and the Admissibility of Evidence of
Flight in Criminal Trials, 65 Va. L. Rev. 597 (1979).
238. Under the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, a similar conclusion might be
reached, although for different reasons. Model Rule 3.7(a) provides:
A lawyer shall not act as advocate at a trial in which the lawyer is likely to be a
necessary witness except where: (1) the testimony relates to an uncontested
issue; (2) the testimony relates to the nature and value of legal services ren-
dered in the case; or (3) disqualification of the lawyer would work substantial
hardship on the client.
Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.7(a) (1983).
Lassar's testimony at a joint trial of Sanders and Dewey would not necessarily have
violated this rule since the testimony might not have related to a contested issue and,
even if it did, the disqualification of an attorney with whom he had a long-standing rela-
tionship might have worked "substantial hardship" on Sanders.
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qualify the defense attorney while Dewey continued to await trial.23 9
Even if the court had been certain that Dewey would in fact testify
against Sanders, the disqualification order might not have been neces-
sary. Lassar asserted in opposition to disqualification that he possessed
no confidential information that could be used to cross-examine
Dewey.2 40 Instead of rejecting this claim out of hand, the trial judge
should have conducted an inquiry like the one endorsed in United States
v. Jeffers24 t to determine (a) whether Lassar was correct; if not, (b)
whether any confidential information in Lassar's possession could be
useful for cross-examination; and, if so, (c) whether Dewey would waive
the confidentiality of the information.2 42 In conducting this inquiry,
the court should have given some weight to the defense attorney's own
assessment, since Lassar was in the best position to decide whether any
confidential information received from Dewey would be useful on
cross-examination. Moreover, the court should have considered the
extent to which any potential for conflict could be reduced or elimi-
nated by allowing Lassar's cocounsel to cross-examine Dewey.2 43
After taking these steps, the trial judge might well have determined
that there was no longer a serious potential for conflict. Moreover,
even if a serious potential for conflict remained, the court should not
have automatically disqualified the defense attorney. Instead, the court
should have considered the special nature of Sanders's interest in pre-
serving his choice of counsel. For example, Sanders's long-term rela-
tionship with Lassar might have made the attorney particularly qualified
to wage a defense. At the same time, the court should have considered
the weakness of its institutional interests: Sanders was a sophisticated
white-collar defendant who was fully capable of understanding the lim-
ited risks posed by Lassar's potential conflict. After having an opportu-
nity to discuss the matter with unconflicted attorneys, Sanders freely
accepted those risks in order to keep Lassar bn the defense team.
Under these circumstances, it is doubtful that acceding to Sanders's
choice of counsel would have made the trial appear unfair or have re-
sulted in an ethical violation.
239. Cf. In re Taylor, 567 F.2d 1183, 1187 (2d Cir. 1977) (disqualification was pre-
mature because premised on contingent events which had not yet occurred); In re Inves-
tigation Before the April 1975 Grand Jury, 531 F.2d 600, 608 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (same).
Nothing in Sanders suggests concern that the trial would be delayed in the event that
Dewey entered into a plea bargain shortly before the trial was scheduled to begin.
240. 688 F. Supp. at 374.
241. 520 F.2d 1256 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1066 (1976).
242. See supra notes 213-215 and accompanying text.
243. The district court rejected this possibility, stating, "[W]e are not sure that this
will be quite the miracle cure that Lassar seems to think it will be." 688 F. Supp. at 374.
The court implied that Lassar was too active a member of Sanders's defense team to
trust him not to disclose Dewey's confidences to cocounsel. Id. By allowing cocounsel
to cross-examine Dewey, Lassar could have preserved Dewey's confidences while al-
lowing a vigorous cross-examination to be conducted. See supra note 183.
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2. The District Court's Second Ruling. - Less than three weeks after
the district court's initial disqualification decision, Dewey pleaded
guilty.244 As a result, Lassar asked the court to reconsider its ruling,
pointing out that he could no longer be called to testify against Dewey
at a joint trial of the two defendants. Moreover, Lassar advised the
court that Dewey now had agreed to waive his attorney-client privilege,
so there would be no conflict arising out of the need to preserve
Dewey's confidences. The court nevertheless rejected Lassar's request,
discovering two new potential conflicts. First, the court found a poten-
tial conflict arising out of the government's possible need to call Lassar
as a witness at Sanders's trial. According to the trial judge, there was a
possibility that the government might call Lassar to testify about his
conversations with Dewey either for the purpose of rebutting a charge
that Dewey's testimony against Sanders was a recent fabrication or for
the purpose of impeaching Dewey, its own witness.2 45 The court also
found a potential conflict arising out of the defendant's possible need
to call Lassar to impeach Dewey. In so doing, it rejected defendant's
offer to forego the use of Lassar's testimony and to waive any claims
arising out of this potential conflict.24 6
The district court made this ruling without conducting an adequate
inquiry and analysis. The court found that disqualification was re-
quired by the mere possibility that Lassar would have to testify for
either the government or the defense. 24 7 Notably, under these circum-
stances, Lassar's withdrawal was not required by the Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility, since it was far from "obvious" that Lassar ought
to testify on Sanders's behalf or was likely to testify against him.2 48 The
244. United States v. Sanders, 690 F. Supp. 677, 678 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
245. Id. at 678. It is questionable whether the government would have been enti-
tled to impeach Dewey by introducing Lassar's testimony about Dewey's prior inconsis-
tent statements. Although the government is ordinarily allowed to impeach its own
witnesses through the introduction of inconsistent statements, see Fed. R. Evid. 607,
613(b), the government "may not call a witness it knows to be hostile for the primay,
purpose of eliciting otherwise inadmissible impeachment testimony, for such a scheme
merely serves as a subterfuge to avoid the hearsay rule." United States v. Hogan, 763
F.2d 697, 702 (5th Cir. 1985); see, e.g., United States v. Crouch, 731 F.2d 621, 622-24
(9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1105 (1985); United States v. Morlang, 531 F.2d
183, 188-90 (4th Cir. 1975). If the government anticipated that Dewey would testify
falsely, as its motion implied, then it would have been inappropriate to call Dewey as a
witness and then to impeach him through Lassar's testimony.
246. 690 F. Supp. at 678-79.
247. The district court's ruling apparently rested on the assumption that Dewey's
agreement to waive the attorney-client privilege so as to permit Lassar's use of his confi-
dences on cross-examination operated as a waiver of the privilege for all purposes, so
that Lassar could be disqualified and called as a witness. It is questionable, however,
whether Dewey's waiver should have been interpreted so broadly. Cf. In re von Bulow,
828 F.2d 94, 100-04 (2d Cir. 1987) (attorney-client privilege waived as to confidential
communications disclosed in book, but not as to any other confidential communications
on same subject matter).
248. See supra note 236 and accompanying text.
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district judge should have inquired whether Lassar had actually learned
anything from Dewey which might be of use to either party2 49 and, if
so, whether stipulations could be used in lieu of Lassar's testimony.25 0
CONCLUSION
When defense counsel has a potential conflict of interest, the trial
judge may respond in a variety of ways, ranging from total inaction to
the disqualification of counsel. One's view of the trial judge's appropri-
ate response must necessarily be colored by a variety of other consider-
ations: one's understanding of the applicable standards of attorney
conduct, one's appraisal of the likelihood that defense attorneys will
abide by those standards in a given situation, one's conception of the
relationship between defense attorneys and their clients and of the
criminal defendant's interest in autonomy in the criminal process, and
one's view of the relative significance of the judiciary's institutional in-
terests. These are not simple considerations.
In Wheat, however, the Supreme Court viewed the adversary pro-
cess simplistically, defining the trial judge's role in light of both an er-
roneous understanding of the ethical standards of the legal profession
and a dubious assumption about defense counsel's role in maintaining
those standards. The Court assumed that the representation of con-
flicting interests is unethical in all cases, ignoring that, in many cases,
the ethical standards either expressly permit or, at least, do not clearly
forbid the representation of conflicting interests. Moreover, the Court
relied on an unwarranted assumption that if a defendant is willing to
waive potential conflict-of-interest claims his attorney probably has not
complied with the ethical standards governing the investigation and
disclosure of potential conflicts.
In many respects, the Wheat decision represents not just a failure to
advance, but, indeed, a step backward in the Court's conception of the
adversary process. The Court inexplicably retreated from the concern
expressed in previous cases for the attorney-client relationship and for
the defendant's autonomy. At the same time, the Court exaggerated
the significance of judicial interests which arguably justify rejecting a
defendant's choice of an attorney who has a potential conflict.
The Wheat decision is also disappointing in its failure to illuminate
how a trial court should exercise its substantial discretion in cases in
which the defendant knowingly and voluntarily chooses an attorney
who has a potential conflict of interest. This Article argues that trial
judges should take a different approach than that taken in Wheat. Giv-
249. The district judge did not know whether Dewey had made any statements to
Lassar that might be admissible at Sanders's trial. This is clear from the judge's conjec-
ture that Lassar's testimony might be needed by either the government or the defense.
690 F. Supp. 678-79.
250. See supra note 212 and accompanying text.
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ing due regard to the defendant's legitimate interest in controlling the
conduct of his defense, a trial judge should aggressively seek alterna-
tives to disqualification. Where none exist, a trial judge should exercise
his discretion in light of a variety of countervailing considerations. Dis-
qualification should be limited to those cases in which the judiciary's
institutional interests are clearly implicated, that is, to cases in which
defense counsel's potential conflict is likely to violate prevailing ethical
norms and to affect the outcome of the case. At the same time, a de-
fendant's choice of counsel should generally be upheld where the de-
fendant's interests are particularly strong, such as where the defendant
has had a long-term relationship with counsel or where the disqualifica-
tion of counsel will result in a complete denial of the ability to retain
counsel. This analysis gives reasonable recognition to the aspects of
the adversary system that ought to define the trial judge's role in con-
flict-of-interest cases.
